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I. INTRODUCTION
As a United States Senator, as a presidential candidate, and now as Vice
President, Joseph Biden has become famous for his unique brand of
extemporaneous remarks and political commentary, so much so that one Los
Angeles Times columnist dubbed him the nation’s “gaffe machine.” 1
Whether explaining to members of Congress that “If we do everything right,
if we do it with absolute certainty, there’s still a 30 percent chance we’re
going to get it wrong”; or thanking an Indian-American supporter by
remarking that “you cannot go to a 7-Eleven or Dunkin Donuts unless you
have a slight Indian accent. And I am not joking!”; or telling a wheelchair
bound public official to “Stand up!” and address a campaign rally, Mr.
Biden possesses a rare gift for saying the inappropriate and the unexpected.2
Given this talent, when Mr. Biden is not cribbing from the speeches of
1. Jonathan Chait, Joe Biden’s Just a Barrel of Gaffes, L.A. TIMES., Feb. 4, 2007, available at
http://articles.latimes.com/2007/feb/04/opinion/op-chait4.
2. These and other unfortunate statements by Mr. Biden are conveniently collected together
with video of Mr. Biden speaking at Top 10 Joe Biden Gaffes, available at
http://www.time.com/time/specials/packages/completelist/0,29569,1895156,00.html.
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fellow politicians,3 he usually can be counted on to say something original if
not especially profound.
During the Vice Presidential Debate that took place on October 11,
2012, Mr. Biden said something that managed to combine the worst aspects
of his public speaking: something that was completely unoriginal, entirely
expected, and in no way profound. When asked about his views on
abortion, he told the audience that his Catholic faith “defines who I am” but
that “I refuse to impose it on equally devout Christians and Muslims and
Jews, and I just refuse to impose that on others.”4 He also insisted that the
claim that the life of a human being begins at conception is a theological
claim: “Life begins at conception in the church’s judgment. I accept it in my
personal life.” 5 Here, Mr. Biden articulated a wholly unoriginal and
unsurprising response to the issue by characterizing opposition to abortion
as being religious in nature. As is often the case, Mr. Biden might have
stated the point more clearly. Still the audience understood what he was
trying to say: Because opposition to abortion is religious, because it depends
on theological beliefs like “life begins at conception,” it is wrong as a
matter of political morality to impose those beliefs on a religiously diverse
society such as ours through the coercive power of the state. Moreover,
because using a law to ban or otherwise restrict abortion constitutes an
“establishment of religion,” it violates the First Amendment to the
Constitution.
Mr. Biden may be forgiven for invoking religion in his answer since the
moderator’s question expressly invited him to do so,6 but others address the

3. Biden was accused of plagiarism while a student at Syracuse University College of Law. As
a presidential candidate he was accused of plagiarizing the speeches of other politicians including John
F. Kennedy, Robert F. Kennedy, Hubert Humphrey, and British M.P. Neil Kinnock. See E.J. Dionne,
Jr., Biden Was Accused of Plagiarism in Law School, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 17, 1987), available at
http://www.nytimes.com/1987/09/17/us/biden-was-accused-of-plagiarism-in-law-school.html;
David
Greenberg, The Write Stuff?: Why Biden’s Plagiarism Shouldn’t Be Forgotten, SLATE MAG. (Aug. 25,
2008),
available
at
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/history_lesson/2008/08/the_write_stuff.html.
4. Transcript of Vice Presidential Debate Between Joseph Biden and Paul Ryan (Oct. 11, 2011),
available
at
http://www.debates.org/index.php?page=october-11-2012-the-biden-romney-vicepresidential-debate.
5. Id. For some additional commentary on Mr. Biden’s answer concerning abortion, see John
M. Breen, The Vice Presidential Debate and Abortion: That’s Just Joe Being Joe!, MIRROR OF JUSTICE
(Oct. 16, 2012), http://mirrorofjustice.blogs.com/mirrorofjustice/2012/10/the-vice-presidential-debateand-abortion-thats-just-joe-being-joe.html.
6. The debate moderator, journalist Martha Raddatz, posed the question this way:
And I would like to ask you both to tell me what role your religion has played in your own
personal views on abortion. Please talk about how you came to that decision. Talk about how
your religion played a part in that. And, please, this is such an emotional issue for so many
people in this country . . . please talk personally about this, if you could.
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topic in the same manner voluntarily and without any prompting, even
where the question discourages such a response. For example, although Mr.
Biden’s running mate, President Barack Obama, was not asked any
questions on the topic of abortion in the 2012 Presidential Debates or
elsewhere in the campaign (largely because of the inattention of the press),
he did address the topic four years earlier during the 2008 campaign.7 At
the Democratic Candidates Compassion Forum hosted on April 13, 2008 at
Messiah College in Pennsylvania, then Senator Obama was asked “[D]o you
personally believe that life begins at conception? And if not, when does it
begin?”8 In response, Mr. Obama introduced religion: “This is something
that I have not, I think, come to a firm resolution on. I think it’s very hard
to know what that means, when life begins. Is it when a cell separates? Is it
when the soul stirs?”9 The question of “when the soul stirs,” like so many
theological controversies, may not be susceptible to resolution in a public
forum. The same may not be said of scientific questions, but Mr. Obama’s
answer suggests that science is not relevant to resolution of the dispute.
Similarly, at the Saddleback Presidential Candidates Forum held on
August 16, 2008, Mr. Obama was specifically asked “[A]t what point does a
baby get human rights, in your view?” 10 Because the question was framed
in terms of “rights” it seemed to call for an answer rooted in legal analysis
and for which a specific time or event (e.g. birth) would suffice. Instead,
Mr. Obama again suggested that the matter was religious and so incapable
of resolution: “Well, you know, I think that whether you’re looking at it
from a theological perspective or a scientific perspective, answering that
question with specificity, you know, is above my pay grade.”11 He went on
to suggest, like Biden, that those who think they have resolved the question
of when life begins have done so on the basis of religion, and this renders
the subject incapable of rational discussion: “[I]f you believe that life begins

Id. That Ms. Raddatz framed her question about abortion in relation to religion reveals as much about
how many in the media view opposition to abortion, which is to say how successful the claim under
review in this essay has been in forming the prism through which the public views the issue. See David
Shaw, Abortion Foes Stereotyped, Some in the Media Believe, L.A. TIMES (July 2, 1990), available at
http://groups.csail.mit.edu/mac/users/rauch/nvp/media/shaw2.html (quoting one reporter as saying that
“Journalists tend to regard opponents of abortion as ‘religious fanatics’ and ‘bug-eyed zealots’”). The
other
three
articles
in
the
series
are
available
at
http://groups.csail.mit.edu/mac/users/rauch/nvp/media/media.html.
7. See Transcript of Democratic Candidates Compassion Forum (April 13, 2008), available at
http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0804/13/se.01.html.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Transcript of Saddleback Presidential Candidates Forum (Aug. 16, 2008), available at
http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0808/16/se.02.html.
11. Id.
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at conception, then – and you are consistent in that belief, then I can’t argue
with you on that, because that is a core issue of faith for you.”12
John Kerry, Mr. Obama’s predecessor as the Democratic Party’s
presidential candidate in 2004, likewise responded to questions on abortion
by invoking religion and then claiming that the religious nature of
opposition to abortion precluded legal regulation of the subject.13
I’m a Catholic, raised a Catholic. I was an altar boy. Religion has
been a huge part of my life. It helped lead me through a war, leads
me today. But I can’t take what is an article of faith for me and
legislate it for someone who doesn’t share that article of faith,
whether they be agnostic, atheist, Jew, Protestant, whatever. I can’t
do that.14
In the final debate of 2004 he reiterated this point once again.15 “I believe
that I can’t legislate or transfer to another American citizen my article of
faith. What is an article of faith for me is not something that I can legislate
on somebody who doesn’t share that article of faith.” 16 For Kerry, the
notion was that he could not regulate abortion even if he wanted to because
to do so would be to impose his religion on others, something that the
Constitution forbids.
Proponents of abortion have long seen religion—in particular
Christianity and Catholicism—as being at the root of opposition to abortion.
Well before elective abortion was legal in any state, Lawrence Lader sought
to portray concern for the unborn child as a faith-based concern that
amounted to a religious conspiracy against freedom. 17 As one of the
founders of the National Association for the Repeal of Abortion Laws,
“NARAL,” 18 Lader devised a “Catholic strategy” that identified the
Catholic Church as “[t]he major opposition to abortion law repeal” and
12. Id.
13. Transcript of the Second Bush-Kerry Presidential Debate (Oct. 8, 2004), available at
http://www.debates.org/index.php?page=october-8-2004-debate-transcript.
14. Id.
15. Transcript of the Third Bush-Kerry Presidential Debate (Oct. 13, 2004), available at
http://www.debates.org/index.php?page=october-13-2004-debate-transcript.
16. Id.
17. See LAWRENCE LADER, ABORTION (1966). Lader continued the theme of characterizing the
pro-life cause as a religious movement—one that sought to impose narrow sectarian beliefs on a diverse
American public made up of believers and non-believers alike—long after Roe v. Wade made abortion a
constitutional right. See LAWERNCE LADER, ABORTION II (1973); LAWRENCE LADER, POLITICS,
POWER, AND THE CHURCH – THE CATHOLIC CRISIS AND ITS CHALLENGE TO AMERICAN PLURALISM
(1987).
18. See DAVID J. GARROW, LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY: THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND THE MAKING
OF ROE V. WADE 350, 360-61 (1994). NARAL later became the National Abortion Rights Action
League. Today the organization goes by the name “NARAL Pro-Choice America.” The group’s
website is available at http://www.naral.org.
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suggested that abortion proponents portray the Church “as a political force,
for the use of anti-Catholicism as a political instrument, and for the
manipulation of Catholics themselves by splitting them and setting them
against each other.”19
The Court did not base its decisions in Roe v. Wade 20 and Doe v.
Bolton21 on establishment clause principles,22 and courts in general have not
been receptive to the claim that anti-abortion laws represent an attempt to
codify the tenets of religious belief. In the realm of public advocacy,
however, the proponents of the abortion license never seem to tire of trying
to portray restrictions on abortion as an exercise in theocracy.
For example, Sunsara Taylor at the pro-choice blog RH Reality Check,
claims that the goal of pro-life organizations, “has NEVER been about
‘protecting fetal life.’ It has always been about insisting that women stay in
their place,” a goal she infers from her reading of the Christian scriptures.23
For Taylor “the movement in this country to restrict, criminalize, and shame
women out of their right to abortion is entirely driven by religion.” 24
Indeed, “[a]side from openly genocidal rationals [sic] (for example, the
19. BERNARD N. NATHANSON, THE ABORTION PAPERS: INSIDE THE ABORTION MENTALITY 177,
181 (1983). As Nathanson, who collaborated with Lader in co-founding NARAL, also wrote, reflecting
on the tactic: “I am ashamed of the use of the anti-Catholic ploy. It was grubby, dangerously divisive,
and probably superfluous. It was a reincarnation of McCarthyism at its worst.” Id. at 200.
20. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
21. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
22. Shortly after Roe was decided, Professor Laurence Tribe argued that the decision of what set
of characteristics make a being “human” calls for “a statement of religious faith upon which people will
invariably differ widely.” Laurence H. Tribe, Foreword: Toward a Model of Roles in the Due Process of
Life and Law, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1, 21 (1973). According to Tribe, Justice Blackmun recognized “the
highly charged and distinctly sectarian religious controversy” that the abortion issue had become and
“though not relied upon by the Court” supports its holding. Id. at 22. For Tribe, government becomes
entangled with religion in violation of the Establishment Clause “whenever the views of organized
religious groups have come to play a pervasive role in an entire subject’s legislative consideration for
reasons intrinsic to the subject matter as then understood.” Id. at 23. He concludes that banning the
destruction of fetal life as the life of a human being cannot be established “in any wholly secular way.”
Id. at 25. Tribe later repudiated these views in his treatise, saying that
on reflection, that view appears to give too little weight to the value of allowing religious
groups freely to express their convictions in the political process, underestimates the power of
moral convictions unattached to religious beliefs on this issue, and makes the unrealistic
assumption that a constitutional ruling could somehow disentangle religion from future
public debate on the question.
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 928 (1st ed. 1978). For a recent, innovative
twist on this argument, see Justin Murray, Exposing the Underground Establishment Clause in the
Supreme Court’s Abortion Cases, 23 REGENT U. L. REV. 1 (2010). Murray argues that Justice
Blackmun’s opinion in Roe did in fact rely upon a concern for the First Amendment, but that this
reliance was tacit, what he terms “the underground Establishment Clause.” He further argues that
abortion restrictions can be plausibly supported on secular grounds.
23. Sunsara Taylor, Abortion, Let’s NOT Leave Religion Out of It!, RH Reality Check (Aug. 27,
2011), available at http://rhrealitycheck.org/article/2011/08/27/abortion-lets-leave-religion/.
24. Id.
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Nazis criminalized abortions for ‘Aryan’ women), this Biblical mandate (or
similar patriarchal mandates of other religions) is the only reason there is to
oppose abortion.”25 According to Taylor, the public needs to confront “the
theocratic core of the movement to end abortion” in order to bring about an
end to the “retrograde, theocratic horror show” that it would institute.26
Others, like Amanda Marcotte, also at RH Reality Check, assert that
restrictions on abortion violate a woman’s right to the free exercise of
religion such that a law restricting abortion is akin to “forcing women to
wear the hijab, forcing kids to say the rosary in school, or banning nonkosher food from restaurants — and [sic] outrageous violation of the right
to choose your own religious beliefs.”27 For Marcotte, to ignore “all the
praying and the Jesus at anti-choice demonstrations” is to throw “women’s
rights to the wolves in order to appease people with a theocratic bent.”28
Still others contend that laws which seek to acknowledge that “life
begins at conception” or that protect the human embryo or fetus as a
“human being” or “person” are attempts to legislate a “religiously held
belief.”29 As New York Times columnist Gail Collins succinctly stated in a
recent column:
If you believe that every fertilized egg is a human being, with the
same sacred rights as a newborn baby, then, obviously, you are not
going to want it to be aborted, no matter how it came into the world.
Politicians who say they oppose all abortions are making perfect
sense, except for the part where they try to impose their doctrinal

25. Id. (emphasis added).
26. Id.
27. Amanda Marcotte, Banning Abortion: The First Step Toward Theocracy, RH Reality Check
(March 11, 2010), available at
http://rhrealitycheck.org/article/2010/03/11/banning-abortion-first-step-toward-theocracy/.
28. Id. It should be noted that writers like Marcotte and Taylor often combine several strands of
the “anti-choice laws are religious” theme in a single column or article. Thus, Taylor insists that belief
in the humanity of the unborn is not scientific because “[s]cientifically, fetuses are NOT children.”
Instead, Taylor asserts that the fetus is “a subordinate part of a woman’s body” that “doesn’t become a
human until it is born and becomes an independent social and biological being.” Taylor, supra note 23.
Similarly, Marcotte asserts that “anti-choicers” are generally “smart enough to realize that making laws
based on their beliefs about ensoulment of zygotes would be a direct violation of the standard
interpretation of the First Amendment” so that instead they “try to graft cockamamie pseudo-scientific
arguments on to their religious beliefs.” Because people disagree about when a fetus becomes a person,
Marcotte contends that “[i]deally, the government would stay out of it until the fetus enters the social
contract by, you know, being born and actually becoming a separate person from its mother.” Marcotte,
supra note 27.
29. Rabbi Aaron Alexander, Abortion: Does My Faith Get a Say?, Huffington Post (July 8,
2013), available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/rabbi-aaron-alexander/abortion-does-my-faithge_b_3552058.html.
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beliefs on the vast majority of the country, which does not share
that particular religious conviction.30
Regardless which of these particular claims is asserted within the general
theme, the conclusion is the same: “The attempt to legislate one set of
religious beliefs about women’s ability to control their reproductive lives is
an offense to a bedrock commitment of America’s constitutional
democracy: freedom of religion and separation of church and state.”31
The legal commentary that has taken up the theme of the connection
between abortion restrictions and religion has, with some exceptions, not
focused on anti-abortion laws as a means of trapping women in religiously
defined gender roles, or as a denial of the right to free exercise.32 Instead,
the focus has been on the last of these claims—that to argue in favor of legal
protection for the entity developing in the womb as a “human being” or
“person” is to advance a religious argument, such that a judicial opinion or
legislative act embracing such an argument should be seen as an
“establishment of religion” in violation of the First Amendment.33
30. Gail Collins, The Sexual Spirit of ‘76, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 24, 2012), available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/23/opinion/collins-the-sexual-spirit-of-76.html?_r=0 .
31. Nancy Northup, Because of, Not In Spite of, My Faith, RH Reality Check (Oct. 14, 2008),
available at http://rhrealitycheck.org/article/2008/10/14/because-not-in-spite-my-faith/.
32. For examples of works that employ these kinds of arguments against restrictions on abortion,
see Silvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 955, 1028 (arguing that antiabortion laws attempt to subordinate women to men and so sustain patriarchal society); Stacy A. Scaldo,
Life, Death & the God Complex: The Effectiveness of Incorporating Religion-Based Arguments into the
Pro-Choice Perspective on Abortion, 39 N. KY. L. REV. 421, 463-65 (2012) (arguing that a shift has
taken place such that the decision to abort and valuation of the fetus are now seen as expressions of
religious liberty and the right to conscience); Gila Stopler, “A Rank Usurpation of Power” – The Role of
Patriarchal Religion and Culture in the Subordination of Women, 15 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 365,
366 (2008) (arguing that religion, through culture and through law, perpetuates the hegemony of
patriarchy). See also Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion
Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REV. 261(1992) (arguing that restrictions on
abortion and contraception in the nineteenth century were an amalgam of moral and religious norms and
a physiological imperative that enforced gender roles, and that the enforcement of those roles is still part
of abortion restrictions today even absent the religious rationale).
33. See, e.g., Tribe, supra note 22; U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, CONSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS
OF THE RIGHT TO LIMIT CHILDBEARING (1975); Jane M. Friedman, The Federal Fetal Experimentation
Regulations: An Establishment Clause Analysis, 61 MINN. L. REV. 961 (1977); David A.J. Richards,
Constitutional Privacy, Religious Disestablishment, and the Abortion Decisions, in ABORTION: MORAL
AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES (Jay L. Garfield & Patricia Hennessey eds. 1984); Jan D. Feldman, Note, The
Establishment Clause and Religious Influences on Legislation, 75 NW. L. REV. 944 (1988); Robert L.
Maddox & Blaine Bortnick, Webster v. Reproductive Health Services: Do Legislative Declarations That
Life Begins at Conception Violate the Establishment Clause?, 12 CAMPBELL L. REV. 1 (1989); John
Morton Cummings, Jr., Note, The State, the Stork, and the Wall: The Establishment Clause and
Statutory Abortion Regulation, 39 CATH. U. L. REV. 1191 (1990); Paul D. Simmons, Religious Liberty
and the Abortion Debate, 32. J. CHURCH & ST. 567 (1990); Karen F.B. Gray, Comment, An
Establishment Clause Analysis of Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 24 GA. L. REV. 399 (1990);
David R. Dow, The Establishment Clause Argument for Choice, 20 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 479
(1990); PETER S. WENZ, ABORTION RIGHTS AS RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (1992); RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE’S
DOMINION: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT ABORTION, EUTHANASIA, AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM (1993)
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As noted above, despite the continuous effort to portray the pro-life
position as inherently religious, and thus illegitimate as a basis for law, the
claim has received little traction in the courts. The most notable exception
to this has been the opinions of Justice John Paul Stevens in three cases:
Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 34
Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 35 and Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.36 In the essay that follows I examine
the claim37 set forth in Stevens’ opinions that arguments made on behalf of
the developing human embryo or fetus are theological arguments that rely
upon religious premises such that they cannot serve as a legitimate basis for
law under the Constitution. My primary method for this examination is to
engage in a close textual reading of each of Justice Stevens’ opinions in
Thornburgh, Webster and Casey.38 Surprisingly, this is something almost
entirely absent in the scholarly literature. I also introduce some of the more
salient criticisms that have been offered in response to the claim that
treating the unborn as subjects of legal concern and respect is inherently
religious—criticisms that were clearly available to Justice Stevens but
which go unanswered in the three opinions.39 I close the essay with a brief
conclusion.40
II. STEVENS’ OPINIONS IN THORNBURGH, WEBSTER, AND CASEY:
MISTAKING A CONCLUSION FOR A SYLLOGISM
In Roe v. Wade the Supreme Court created a constitutional right to
abortion under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 41
Although Justice Blackmun’s majority opinion referred to religion on
several occasions, these references were not central to the Court’s holding.42
The Court did not base its decision on either free exercise or establishment
(arguing for abortion based on both free exercise and establishment clause principles); Paul D. Simmons,
Religious Liberty and Abortion Policy: Casey as “Catch-22”, 42 J. CHURCH & ST. 69 (2000); Edward L.
Rubin, Sex, Politics, and Morality, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 220 (2005); Larry J. Pittman, Embryonic
Stem Cell Research and Religion: The Ban on Federal Funding as a Violation of the Establishment
Clause, 68 U. PITT. L. REV. 131 (2006).
34. 476 U.S. 747, 772-82 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring).
35. 492 U.S. 490, 560-72 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
36. 505 U.S. 833, 911-922 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
37. I refer to this argumentative strategy as a “claim” and not simply an “argument” because, as
will be seen, what is offered is often little more than a bare assertion—a simple claim that the pro-life
position is inherently religious with no analysis as to what constitutes a “religion,” what makes a legal
proposition “religious” in nature, or how the presence of this purported quality can be demonstrated in a
principled fashion.
38. See infra Part II.
39. See infra Part II.
40. See infra. Part III.
41. Roe, 410 U.S. 113, 153-55.
42. See generally, id.
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clause principles.43 Rather, the Court’s references to religion were part of
Justice Blackmun’s strategy in writing an opinion that “place[d] some
emphasis upon[] medical and medical-legal history” and what Blackmun
understood “that history [to] reveal[] about man’s attitudes toward the
abortion procedure over the centuries.”44
Blackmun noted in passing that “[a]ncient religion did not bar
abortion.” 45 He also observed that Christian theology and canon law
addressed the question of when the fetus became “infused with a ‘soul’ or
‘animated,’” an issue that influenced the development of the common law.46
With respect to contemporary religious views on the subject, the
outstanding fact for Blackmun appears to have been the lack of “any
consensus”47 and the “wide divergence of thinking on this most sensitive
and difficult question” of when life begins. 48 Thus, he notes that “the
predominant, though not the unanimous, attitude of the Jewish faith” was
that life does not begin until live birth, a position he also took “to represent .
. . a large segment of the Protestant community.”49 He further notes that
43. In a recent, fascinating article, Justin Murray argues that in Roe and its progeny the Supreme
Court “implicitly rel[ied] upon First Amendment-type arguments to justify abortion rights, but without
ever explicitly referring to the First Amendment,” an approach he calls the “underground Establishment
Clause.” Murray, supra note 22, at 4.
44. Roe, 410 U.S. at 117. Unfortunately, the legal history of abortion that Blackmun set forth
was deeply flawed relying heavily and uncritically on a pair of law review articles authored by
NARAL’s general counsel, Cyril Means. Indeed, in his comprehensive, magisterial study of abortion
history, Joseph Dellapenna, with some indignation (backed by voluminous evidence) labels Means’
history a “myth.” See JOSEPH W. DELLAPENNA, DISPELLING THE MYTHS OF ABORTION HISTORY 13-24,
683-695 (2006). According to Dellapenna, “[t]he best way to understand Blackmun’s opinion in Roe is
as an argument from history” and to see that Justice Blackmun “deriv[ed] his version from Cyril Means’
specious history of abortion law.” Id. at 689. See also Robert M. Byrn, An American Tragedy: The
Supreme Court on Abortion, 41 FORDHAM L. REV. 807, 814-839 (1973) (refuting the Court’s “distorted
and incomplete” history derived from Cyril Means).
45. Roe, 410 U.S. at 130. Here, it seems that “ancient religion” refers to the pagan religions of
ancient Greece and Rome since that is the context in which this remark appears. The relevance of this
absence of prohibition with respect to the constitutionality of abortion is far from clear, however, since
“ancient religion” also did not bar infanticide and gladiatorial games.
46. Id. at 133.
47. Id. at 159. This lack of consensus was not confined to religion. It was, he said, a common
feature “in the respective disciplines of medicine, philosophy, and theology.” Id. What is especially
remarkable about this statement is the supposed lack of consensus in “medicine.” It is nothing short of
astounding for Justice Blackmun to allege such a purported lack of consensus in that Justice Blackmun
does not engage in anything even approaching a comprehensive review of the medical literature on the
question of when a human life begins. Instead, he confines the authorities he cites to two standard texts.
Id. at 132 n. 20, 160 n. 59, 60 (citing DORLAND’S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY (24th ed. 1965)
and L. HELLMAN & J. PRITCHARD, WILLIAMS OBSTETRICS (14th ed. 1971)). Moreover, Justice
Blackmun made this statement notwithstanding the voluminous medical authorities cited in the Brief for
Appellees, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (No. 70-18), 1971 WL 134281 and the Motion and Brief
Amicus Curiae of Certain Physicians, Professors and Fellows of the American College of Obstetrics and
Gynecology in Support of Appellees, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (No. 70-18), WL 128057, that
support the opposite conclusion.
48. Roe, 410 U.S. at 160.
49. Id.
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“the Aristotelian theory of ‘mediate animation’” was “official Roman
Catholic dogma until the 19th century” but that now the Church
“recognize[s] the existence of life from the moment of conception.”50
Perhaps the Roe court’s most significant remark with respect to religion
was Blackmun’s oblique reference to the religious debate swirling around
the issue in which he observed that a person’s philosophy, life experiences,
and “religious training . . . are all likely to influence and to color one’s
thinking and conclusions about abortion.”51 Although this passage hints at
the theme of religion as a source of political divisiveness—a theme also
present in the Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence52—the opinion
does not suggest that concern for sectarian strife informed the Court’s
decision, nor does the opinion indicate that only certain views as to how
fetal life ought to be valued are “religious.” All of which is to say that
Justice Stevens’ opinions concerning the purportedly religious nature of the
pro-life position cannot be traced back directly to Roe. They are instead
Stevens’ original contribution to the Court’s abortion jurisprudence.53
Justice Stevens set forth his views on the supposedly religious character
of laws that seek to protect the entity developing in the womb at some
length in both Thornburgh and Webster, and briefly but significantly in
Casey. Stevens’ argumentative strategy in these opinions is exemplary of
those who subscribe to this point-of-view—in what he says, in what he
presumes, and in what he fails to mention. As will be seen, Stevens does
not so much argue for that which he purports to demonstrate—the religious
character of pro-life legislation—as he does assert his basic claim to be true
and then repeat this assertion as a conclusion.

50. Id. at 160-61.
51. Id. at 116.
52. See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 622-623 (1971) (“Ordinarily political debate
and division, however vigorous or even partisan, are normal and healthy manifestations of our
democratic system of government, but political division along religious lines was one of the principle
evils against which the First Amendment was intended to protect.”); McCreary County v. American
Civil Liberties Union of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 881 (2005) (“We are centuries away from the St.
Bartholomew’s Day massacre and the treatment of heretics in early Massachusetts, but the divisiveness
of religion in current public life is inescapable.”); see also Richard W. Garnett, Religion, Division, and
the First Amendment, 94 GEO. L. J. 1667 (2006) (arguing that divisiveness is more a rhetorical theme
and less an operative rule in religion clause jurisprudence).
53. What is surprising is that this contribution did not appear sooner. Justice Stevens joined the
Court in 1975 and participated in the Court’s decision in Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980). That
case involved an establishment clause challenge to the “Hyde Amendment,” a restriction on the use of
federal Medicaid funds to pay for abortions. The plaintiffs in the case clearly presented the argument
that the funding restriction was unconstitutional because “it incorporate[d] into law the doctrines of the
Roman Catholic Church concerning the sinfulness of abortion and the time at which life commences.”
Id. at 319. Yet Justice Stevens did not embrace this argument until his opinion in Thornburgh in 1986.
See infra Part II.A.
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Stevens’ opinions are also significant because the claim that he
advances—that the pro-life position is inherently religious—has proven to
be a decidedly minority opinion on the Court. Of the eighteen Supreme
Court justices with whom Stevens served while on the Court from 1975 to
2010, Stevens is the only justice to author an opinion dedicated to this
point-of-view. Three other justices—Blackmun, Brennan, and Marshall—
expressed support for this perspective,54 but no other justice joined Justice
Stevens in his opinions in Thornburgh, Webster, or Casey.55 Significantly,
none of these four justices is still on the Court. It remains to be seen
whether Justice Stevens’ successor, Justice Elena Kagan, or any of the other
justices who joined the Court since Casey will champion this point-of-view.
If a right to abortion is to be explained and defended in future Supreme
Court opinions, one would hope that the Court would offer a more plausible
account than the Establishment Clause claim put forth by Stevens in
Thornburgh, Webster, and Casey. Although Justice Stevens has many
admirers,56 an honest assessment of these opinions must conclude that they
constitute the intellectual low-point of Stevens’ tenure on the bench.
A. Justice Stevens’ Opinion in Thornburgh v. American College of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists
In Thornburgh the Court struck down portions of a Pennsylvania statute
requiring a woman seeking an abortion to give informed consent to the
procedure and to receive certain printed information prior to her giving
consent. The Court also invalidated provisions that required the physician
performing the abortion to make a report regarding the doctor’s
determination that the aborted fetus was not viable, as well as a set of
provisions that would have required a second physician to be present during
54. See Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490, 537, 552-554 (J., Blackmun,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall); Planned Parenthood
of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 922, 932 (J., Blackmun, concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
55. See Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 772; Webster, 492 U.S. at 560; Casey, 505 U.S. at 912.
56. For a glowing portrayal of Stevens as the independently minded, moderate yet erudite
member of a Court lurching towards the right, see Jeffrey Rosen, The Dissenter, Justice John Paul
Stevens,
N.Y.
TIMES
MAG.
(Sept.
23,
2007),
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/23/magazine/23stevens-t.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
See also
Charles Lane, With Longevity on Court Stevens’ Center-Left Influence Has Grown, WASH. POST (Feb.
21,
2006),
available
at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2006/02/20/AR2006022001196.html; James Oliphant, Justice from the South Side,
CHI. TRIB. (Oct. 20, 2008), available at http://archives.chicagotribune.com/2008/oct/20/nation/chiobama-stevensoct20. Justice Stevens’ work on the Court has been the subject of several law review
symposia. See Symposium: The Legacy of Justice John Paul Stevens, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 409 (2012);
The Finest Legal Mind: A Symposium in Celebration of Justice John Paul Stevens, 99 GEORGETOWN L.
J. 1263 (2011); Symposium: The Honorable John Paul Stevens, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 713 (2010);
Symposium: The Jurisprudence of Justice Stevens, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1557 (2006).
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a post-viability abortion and to work to protect the life and health of the
unborn child.57
Justice Stevens’ concurrence in Thornburgh appears to have been
inspired by a forceful dissent in the case written by Justice Byron White.
Although Justice White was one of the two original dissenters in Roe,
Stevens sees White’s Thornburgh opinion as being at odds with White’s
concurrences in earlier decisions in the Court’s right to privacy line of
precedent: Griswold v. Connecticut,58 Eisenstadt v. Baird,59 and Carey v.
Population Services International.60
In Thornburgh, Justice White argued that “the time has come to
recognize that Roe v. Wade . . . ‘departs from a proper understanding’ of the
Constitution and to overrule it.” 61 His argument that Roe should be
overturned was not based on a “plain meaning,” originalist approach to
constitutional interpretation or a rejection of “substantive due process” as
such.62 White acknowledged that:
[t]he Constitution is not a deed setting forth the precise metes and
bounds of its subject matter; rather, it is a document announcing
fundamental principles in value-laden terms that leave ample scope
for the exercise of normative judgment by those charged with
interpreting and applying it.63
White’s fear, however, was that the Court’s recognition of fundamental
rights “not specifically enumerated in the text of the Constitution”64 would
reflect “its own controversial choices of value,” 65 “the philosophical
predilections of individual judges” and not “the basic choices made by the
people themselves in constituting their system of government.” 66 He
concluded that under the two definitions of fundamental rights employed by
the Court—“those interests that are ‘implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty’ such that ‘neither liberty nor justice would exist if [they] were
sacrificed’” and those liberties “that are ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

See Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 758-772.
381 U.S. 479 (1965).
405 U.S. 438 (1972).
431 U.S. 678 (1977).
Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 788 (White, J., dissenting).
See id.
Id. at 789.
Id. at 790.
Id.
Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 791.
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history and tradition’” 67 —the Court’s decision in Roe failed the test of
legitimacy.
Justice White’s dissent focused on the Roe majority’s treatment of the
state’s interest in protecting fetal life.68 He distinguished Roe and the case
at bar in Thornburgh from the privacy line of cases involving the use of
contraceptives—Carey, Eisenstadt, and Griswold—based on Roe’s own
words that “[t]he pregnant woman cannot be isolated in her privacy” 69
insofar as abortion “typically involves the destruction of another entity: the
fetus.” 70 Whereas Roe variously referred to “potential life,” 71 “potential
human life,”72 and “the potentiality of human life,”73 Justice White referred
to “the life” of the entity in the womb whose “continued existence and
development” were “so directly at stake in the woman’s decision whether or
not to terminate her pregnancy, that [the] decision [to abort] must be
recognized as sui generis, different in kind from others that the Court has
protected under the rubric of personal or family privacy and autonomy.”74
Whereas contraception involves the decision to avoid something from
coming into existence, abortion involves a decision to kill something that
already exists. Moreover, this thing that already exists
is an entity that bears in its cells all the genetic information that
characterizes a member of the species homo sapiens and
distinguishes an individual member of the species from all others,
and . . . there is no nonarbitrary line separating [it] . . . from a child,
or indeed, an adult human being.75
In stating these facts, White eschews what he describes as “the
metaphysical or theological question whether the fetus is a ‘human being’ or
the legal question whether it is a ‘person’ as that term is used in the
Constitution.” 76 Nevertheless, for White, these facts may serve as the
predicate for a subsequent normative decision. The state has an interest “in
protecting those who will be citizens if their lives are not ended in the
womb.”77 Moreover, this interest is “in the fetus as an entity in itself.” 78
67. Id. at 790-791(quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 320 U.S. 319, 325 (1937) and Moore v. East
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)).
68. See id. at 785 -814.
69. Id. at 792 (quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 159 (1973)).
70. Id.
71. Roe, 410 U.S. at 150, 156, 163.
72. Id. at 159.
73. Id. at 162.
74. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 792 (White, J., dissenting).
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 795.
78. Id.
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This view stands in sharp contrast to Justice Stevens who would confine the
state’s interest to only instrumental concerns. 79
1. “Proving” the Religious Character of Legislation: Winning
an Argument Without Really Having One
What Justice Stevens finds most troubling in Justice White’s opinion is
his valuation of nascent human life—a valuation that Stevens views as
inherently religious. With respect to White’s claim “that the governmental
interest in protecting fetal life is equally compelling during the entire period
from the moment of conception until the moment of birth,” Stevens says
that he “recognize[s] that a powerful theological argument can be made for
that position, but I believe our jurisdiction is limited to the evaluation of
secular state interests.”80 “[T]here is,” says Stevens, “a fundamental and
well-recognized difference between a fetus and a human being” that will
continue to hold sway “unless the religious view that a fetus is a ‘person’ is
adopted.”81
Like other legal commentators who accuse abortion opponents of
wrongfully trying to incorporate a religious viewpoint into law, Justice
Stevens never explains why the belief that a nascent human life should be
considered a legal “person” or should otherwise enjoy legal protection is
“religious” or “theological.” 82 He simply assumes the point and then
employs the assumption rhetorically in order to dismiss an argument he
never squarely confronts. On the surface, Stevens appears to win an
argument without really having one, but the victory is only apparent since
the substance of his argument is a mere accusation, not a conclusion drawn
from premises with which his opponents agree or which are themselves
substantiated on independent grounds that he elaborates.
2. A Changing State Interest vs. An Increasing State Interest
For Stevens “it [is] obvious that the State’s interest in the protection of
an embryo . . . increases progressively and dramatically as the organism’s
capacity to feel pain, to experience pleasure, to survive, and to react to
surroundings increases day by day.” 83 Because “[t]he development of a
fetus – and pregnancy itself – are not static conditions,” Justice Stevens

79. Although this view is implicit in Justice Stevens’ opinion in Thornburgh, he made it explicit
in Casey, 505 U.S. at 915 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See also infra notes
279-284 and accompanying text.
80. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 778 (Stevens, J., concurring).
81. Id. at 779.
82. See id. at 778-779.
83. Id. at 778.
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thinks that it is wrong to conceive of the state’s interest as simply static.84
For him it seems “quite odd to argue that distinctions may not also be drawn
between the state interest in protecting the freshly fertilized egg and the
state interest in protecting the 9-month-gestated, fully sentient fetus on the
eve of birth.”85
Because this conclusion is “obvious” to Stevens, he never burdens
himself with the effort of trying to explain not whether the state’s interest
changes over the course of fetal development, but why it allegedly
increases. It is indeed obvious that the state’s interest changes over this
period of growth and maturation, just as the state’s interest in the welfare of
an infant changes over the time that it develops into a toddler, youth,
adolescent, mature adult, and aging senior. Plainly, this extended period of
development is not “static” any more than the period of development in
utero is static, and the state’s interest does not remain “static” in the sense
of unchanged—wholly fixed and unaltered—during either period. But
change and increase are distinct concepts. It is decidedly not obvious that
the state’s interest in an infant increases as it grows into a toddler—that the
state may value toddlers more than it values infants, and adolescents more
than it values toddlers. Stevens’ opinion directly implies this radical
conclusion, but because he is enamored with the obviousness of his own
assertion, he does not trouble himself with explaining how this can be
permissible under our constitutional system of equal protection.86
In a similar fashion, Stevens makes note of the growth in capacities that
accompanies the physiological changes in the developing organism—the
“capacity to feel pain, to experience pleasure, to survive, and to react to its
surroundings.”87 But because it is all so obvious to Stevens, the reader of
his opinion is left to wonder how this change in capacity brings about an
increase in the state’s interest in the human being undergoing these
changes. Again, it does seem plain that the state’s interest is different, and
not static, but to say that this interest is quantitatively greater is a radical
claim sorely in need of argument. Stevens’ plaintiff cry of obviousness
simply will not do. Indeed, his bare assertion of greater state interest in
those who possess these capacities suggests that the state’s interest in a
human being who is unable to feel pain or experience pleasure—an
anesthetized patient, an unconscious or comatose individual—is less than its
84. Id.
85. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 779.
86. Under the Court’s equal protection doctrine, age is subject to rational basis review. See, e.g.,
Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976); Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93
(1979). Even under this deferential standard it is difficult to conceive of the Court approving of the
exclusion of classes of individuals from the benefit of laws against murder and assault based on age.
87. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 778.
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interest in a human being who currently enjoys these capacities. Although
he seems oblivious to the fact, the value that Stevens places on the capacity
“to feel pain, to experience pleasure, to survive, and to react to its
surroundings” raises the question of whether a non-human animal that
possesses these capacities ought to be regarded as a subject of concern,
respect, and protection by the state.
3. For and Against the Fetus: The Mutuality of “Religious”
Judgment
Stevens does not bother to address these matters because doing so
would require him to question why he believes that these capacities (and
even the quality of being “human”) are valuable—why they prompt the state
to have an interest in the being who possesses them and why these
capacities render such governmental interest legitimate. Facing these sorts
of questions, however, would force Stevens to confront his own value
preferences—preferences that are, without more, equally susceptible to
being characterized as religious if by “religious” we mean normative.
If describing a claim as “religious” means that the claim depends upon
value judgments that are ultimately unprovable from an empirical point of
view, then the perspective that regards the unborn as something of
incalculable worth is no more or less “religious” than the perspective that
regards them as being of no value whatsoever—a trivial item of refuse
easily discarded and soon forgotten. Moreover, such an understanding of
“religious” could not serve as the standard for the enforcement of the
Establishment Clause. As Michael Perry notes, it would be “ridiculous” to
claim that the Establishment Clause proscribes moral beliefs “as a basis for
political deliberation, justification, or choice.” 88 Law is ineluctably
normative such that government would be stymied in every way if it could
not engage in normative deliberation and decision. If the exercise of
normative judgment was unconstitutional “[o]n what basis . . . could
political deliberation, justification, and choice proceed?” 89 Similarly, if
describing a claim as “religious” means that it is “metaphysical” then both
perspectives are “religious” since each adopts an ontological stance with
respect to the entity developing in the womb. 90
88 MICHAEL J. PERRY, LOVE AND POWER: THE ROLE OF RELIGION AND MORALITY IN AMERICAN
POLITICS 112-113 (1991).
89 Id. at 113.
90. Furthermore, neither the Establishment Clause nor any other part of the Constitution bars the
use of metaphysical premises in the formulation of law. A great deal of our law—such as culpability in
criminal law and liability in tort—is premised upon metaphysical beliefs, like “free will,” that cannot be
demonstrated on the basis of empirical science. Indeed, the metaphysical presuppositions that underlie
the law go even deeper than this. The very idea that the universe is rational and the very notion of
material causation—the foundations of all empirical science—are premises that science itself cannot
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This is precisely the point that Justice White made in his Thornburgh
dissent—a point to which neither Justice Stevens nor any of his colleagues
have ever responded, either in Thornburgh or in any of the Court’s
subsequent abortion decisions. White says that “contrary to Justice
Stevens” the state’s claim that it has a compelling interest in the life of the
entity developing in the womb prior to viability “is no more a ‘theological’
position than is the Court’s own judgment that viability is the point at which
the state interest becomes compelling.”91 It is quite telling, as White notes,
that Stevens “omits any real effort to defend this judgment.”92 The reason
for this absence is plain: Defending this judgment would mean
prove. The continuity of the universe from moment to moment is, as David Hume argued, something
that must be supposed, not proven. “It is impossible . . . that any arguments from experience can prove
this resemblance of the past to the future; since all these arguments are founded on the supposition of
that resemblance.” David Hume, An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding (1748), in THE
ENGLISH PHILOSOPHERS FROM BACON TO MILL 585, 606 (Edwin A. Burtt ed. 1939). With respect to
causation, we observe “[o]ne event follows another; but we never can observe any tie between them.
They seem conjoined, but never connected.” Id. at 630. We suppose “that there is some connection
between them” but this connection is something “which we feel in the mind, this customary transition of
the imagination from one object to its usual antecedant, is the sentiment or impression from which we
form the idea of power or necessary connection.” Id. But this is only a supposition. In short, the modern
conception of reason in science is what most people today would call “faith.” It assumes that which it
cannot prove. Science “presupposes the mathematical structure of matter, its intrinsic rationality” and it
maintains that “only the possibility of verification or falsification through experimentation can yield
decisive certainty.” Pope Benedict XVI, Lecture of the Holy Father at the Aula Magna of the University
of Regensburg, Faith, Reason and the University: Memories and Reflections (Sept. 12, 2006)
[hereinafter
Regensburg
Address],
available
at
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/speeches/2006/september/documents/hf_benxvi_spe_20060912_university-regensburg_en.html. Indeed, “[m]odern scientific reason quite simply
has to accept the rational structure of matter and the correspondence between our spirit and the
prevailing rational structures of nature as a given, on which its methodology has to be based.” Id. In
other words, science “presupposes that which it also rejects – something that cannot be verified or
falsified through experimentation, namely, the intrinsic rationality of matter and the correspondence and
receptivity of the human mind to that rationality.” John M. Breen, Religion and the Purification of
Reason: Why the Liberal State Requires More Than Simple Tolerance, 33 CAMPBELL L. REV. 505, 514
(2011). Insofar as law relies upon science, it relies upon the metaphysical presuppositions upon which
science depends.
91. Thornburgh 476 U.S. at 795 n. 4 (White, J., dissenting).
92. Id. In Roe Justice Blackmun declared that “the State’s important and legitimate interest in
potential life” becomes “compelling” at viability “because the fetus then presumably has the capability
of meaningful life outside the mother’s womb.” Roe, 410 U.S. at 163. As Justice White observed,
however, saying this was equivalent to saying that the state’s interest becomes compelling at viability
because viability is when the state’s interest becomes compelling. It was “to mistake a definition for a
syllogism.” John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L. J. 920,
924 (1973). See Thornburgh, 476 U.S, at 795 (White, J., dissenting) (citing Ely). Like every other
justice who has voted in favor of the abortion license created in Roe, Stevens fails to explain why the
state’s interest becomes compelling at viability. But Justice Stevens’ failure goes beyond that of his
fellow Roe supporters. He fails to explain why the state’s interest in the developing fetus is transformed
from a “religious” interest prior to viability into a “secular” interest after viability. Indeed, he fails to
explain how to distinguish between an impermissible normative judgment that is “religious” and a
permissible normative judgment that is “secular.” In the absence of reasoned deliberation, in the absence
of any explanation defending these judgments—judgments that lie at the heart of his opinion—Justice
Stevens opts for labels.

2013]

THE ACCUSATION OF ESTABLISHMENT

841

acknowledging it to be a normative judgment, and indeed a normative
judgment that is not mandated by the Constitution, rather than treating it as
an axiom of constitutional law that may not be questioned.
Others have elaborated on this point. Indeed, years before the
Thornburgh decision, John Noonan thoughtfully responded to the argument
put forth by Laurence Tribe identifying the pro-life position with religion.
Tribe argued that abortion “was a subject of a religious nature because it
involved ‘a decision as to what characteristics should be regarded as
defining a human being,’ and that the decision ‘depended on a statement of
religious faith upon which people will invariably differ.’”93 But Noonan
observed that Tribe used this theory in an unmistakably one-sided manner.
If the act of designating a particular set of characteristics as constituting a
“human being” is “religious” then this act of designation is “religious” no
matter which characteristics are selected. That is, if Tribe was correct that
the question of which entities count as human beings is inescapably
religious, then “any decision as to who is human would be a religious
decision.”94 On this account, there is no reason to exempt the selection of
those criteria that would exclude fetuses and embryos from consideration as
“human beings” and dismiss as theological and illicit those criteria that
include fetuses and embryos as “human beings.” Rather, an argument must
be made that certain criteria are inescapably “religious” and others properly
“secular.” Justice Stevens, of course, offers no such argument either in
Thornburgh or anywhere else.
4. Disputing the Analogy: Not Human
A defender of Justice Stevens’ opinion might respond that the analogies
offered above rest on a mistaken premise—a premise that Stevens expressly
rejects in the body of his opinion, namely, the idea that the fetus is a
“human being.” After all, Stevens postulates that “there is a fundamental
and well-recognized difference between a fetus and a human being.” 95
Indeed, for Stevens it is this very difference that explains and justifies the
distinctions between “the state interest in protecting the freshly fertilized
93. John T. Noonan, Jr., A Private Choice: Abortion in America in the Seventies 23 (1979) (quoting
Tribe, supra note 22 at 21). See also Francis J. Beckwith, Gimme That Ol’ Time Separation: A Review
Essay, 8 Chapman L. Rev. 309, 325 (2005) (reviewing Philip Hamburger, Separation of Church and
State (Paperback ed. 2004)) (arguing that “both the pro-lifer and the abortion-choice advocate present”
competing anthropologies such that in response to the pro-lifer “the abortion-choice advocate attempts to
justify his position by offering what is essentially a different metaphysical account,” but only the pro-life
point of view is excluded as “religious”; and concluding that “[t]here seems no good reason, except a
kind of crass philosophical apartheid, which would justify the [abortion-choice] account having a
rightful place in politics and law, while its pro-life alternative is relegated” to private conversations
about theology).
94. Id.
95. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 779 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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egg and the state interest in protecting the 9-month-gestated, fully sentient
fetus on the eve of birth.”96 Thus, a defender of Stevens’ opinion would
argue that the analogies above are mistaken because they rely upon a false
premise. The state’s interest in an infant is different from (but not more
than) its interest in an adolescent, but it is incorrect to compare this change
in interests to the state’s interest in an infant and its quite different interest
in the fetus for the simple reason that the latter is not a “human being.”
But this is no answer to the criticism posed by the analogies precisely
because Stevens merely postulates that the entity in the womb is not a
“human being” prior to birth. Here, Justice Stevens supposes a meaning for
the term “human being” that he does not explain, let alone defend. Just as
with Stevens’ claim that the state may value the entity in the womb prior to
viability solely based on a “theological argument,” 97 his claim that the
“fetus” is not a “human being” is a mere assertion. He does not offer any
argument on behalf of this claim. He simply pre-supposes that it is true.
One cannot simply dismiss the analogies as inapt and then claim to have
demonstrated that they are false.
5. Two Meanings of “Human Being”: Descriptive and
Prescriptive
In fact, the meaning of the term “human being” can be equivocal in that
the term may be employed prescriptively or descriptively.98 This point was
alluded to in the discussion above,99 and Justice White, in fact, shows how
the term may be used in a normative fashion when he refers to the question
of “whether the fetus is a ‘human being’” as a “metaphysical or theological
question.”100
When the term “human being” is used in a purely prescriptive or
normative sense it denotes a meaning. It does not refer to a class of entities
existent in the world. It is void of all descriptive content. Instead, the term
indicates how those entities that enjoy the designation “human being” are to
be treated. Used in this manner the term “human being” refers to a member
of the moral community, an entity deserving of dignity and respect, a rightsbearer. To say that something is a “human being” in this prescriptive sense
is the same as saying that it is a “person” either in the moral or the legal
96. Id.
97. Id. at 778; see also supra Part II.A.1.
98. The term “person” may also be used in a descriptive manner and in a prescriptive manner.
For an excellent discussion of these distinctive kinds of meaning and how they are often employed in the
abortion debate see Daniel Wikler, Concepts of Personhood: A Philosophical Perspective, in DEFINING
HUMAN LIFE: MEDICAL, LEGAL AND ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS 12 (Margaret W. Shaw & A. Edward
Doudera eds. 1983).
99. See supra notes 82-85 and accompanying text.
100. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 792 (White, J., dissenting).
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sense. To say that an entity is a “human being” in this sense is to identify
the entity as a being to whom certain obligations are owed.
When the term “human being” is used in a purely descriptive sense it
denotes a class of entities that share a certain set of characteristics. The
most basic meaning of the term “human being,” used in this descriptive
sense, refers to a distinct, individual human organism—a member of the
species homo sapiens. This might be called the scientific use of the term. In
the alternative, used descriptively the term “human being” might refer to a
member of the species homo sapiens that has achieved a certain stage in the
process of development. This manner of using the term “human being” in a
descriptive sense often appears in the abortion debate. For example, the
term “human being” may refer to a human organism that has implanted in
the uterine wall and so no longer possesses the capacity to undergo
“twinning,” or has developed to the point where the “primitive streak” (the
foundation of the nervous system) appears, or where the organism has the
appearance of primordial human form. In the same way, the presence of a
heartbeat, the detection of brainwaves, the mother’s experience of fetal
movement or “quickening,” the attainment of viability, or birth itself may be
taken as the achievement that marks the beginning of a new “human being.”
The term “human being” may even be used to refer to human organisms that
possess certain cognitive capacities such as sentience, self-consciousness,
the use of language, or the ability to engage in higher reasoning. The
difficulty with these uses of the term is that they are not strictly descriptive.
Instead, each of these definitions of “human being” contains an element of
the prescriptive. Each of these candidates for the descriptive content of
“human being” is normative—it attaches value to one or another set of
characteristics to conclude that an entity possessing these qualities ought to
be regarded as a “human being.”
The same could be said of any scientific categorization—the discovery
of new a species of mammal,101 the identification of a new element 102 or
subatomic particle, 103 or the classification of a celestial body. 104 In each

101. Bryan Walsh, Hola, Olinguita! The Smithsonian Discovers a New Mammal, TIME MAG.
(Aug. 15, 2013), available at http://science.time.com/2013/08/15/hola-olinguito-the-smithsoniandiscovers-a-new-mammal/ (describing discovery of new species of carnivorous mammal found in South
America).
102. Monica Hesse, Make Room at the Periodic Table: A New Element Is Born, WASH. POST
(Aug.
29,
2013)
available
at
http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-0829/lifestyle/41578283_1_element-115-periodic-table-applied-chemistry (describing the discovery of
ununpentium by Swedish scientists).
103. Brian Greene, How the Higgs-Boson Was Found, SMITHSONIAN MAG. (July-Aug. 2013),
available
at
http://www.smithsonianmag.com/science-nature/How-the-Higgs-Boson-Was-Found213876841.html?c=y&page=1#Higgs-boson-ATLAS-detector-1.jpg. (describing the Higgs Boson
particle and its discovery).

844

OHIO NORTHERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39

case, those who are expert within the particular scientific discipline settle
upon a set of criteria, the satisfaction of which results in the conclusion that
some phenomenon ‘P’ with characteristics ‘x1, x2, x3, . . . xn’ is a certain
kind of thing ‘Q.’ In doing so, scientists are saying that entities that possess
the designated characteristics ought to be understood as the kind of thing in
the defined category. But this judgment is normative only in the sense of
how the entity will be regarded within the scientific discipline—for
example, whether or not Pluto will be regarded as a planet by astronomers,
or whether biologists believe that a given animal represents a new species as
opposed to one previously discovered. Scientists are, of course, subject to
the same failings that we all suffer from—the intrusion of ego, ambition and
pride—such that the identification of the relevant characteristics may be
infected with concerns extraneous to the exercise of scientific judgment.105
The “human element,” as it were, is always present in the process of
science. Still, it is possible to envision the discernment of criteria and the
exercise of scientific judgment in which these extraneous factors are not
present.
The selection of criteria may, however, be corrupted in another way.
Defining what constitutes a “human being” by designating a given set of
observable traits can be “normative” in the sense of how the entity will be
treated outside the scientific discipline of biology. The presumption in
American law is that every “human being” in the descriptive sense also
enjoys the benefit of law. Indeed, every being recognized as a “human
being” also enjoys the status of a legal “person”—the status of a rightsholder, a being to whom obligations are owed—one who enjoys immunity
from certain forms of government coercion and the benefit of government
protection from other persons. A “person” is a subject under the law and
not merely an object to be exploited and discarded—“someone” not
“something.” The status of legal personhood sets an entity apart from
things that have no special dignity and that can be disposed of or otherwise
manipulated by those in power. There are of course exceptions in our legal
history to the full inclusion of all human beings within the category of legal

104. Steven J. Dick, Pluto, Classification, and Exploration, NASA: Why We Explore (Sept. 5,
2006), available at http://www.nasa.gov/exploration/whyweexplore/Why_We_23_prt.htm (discussing
the International Astronomical Union’s new definition of “planet” in which such an object must have
“cleared the neighborhood around its orbit”).
105. See Shankar Vedantam, For Pluto, a Smaller World After All, WASH. POST (Aug. 25, 2006),
available
at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2006/08/24/AR2006082400109.html. (describing the argument over the new
definition of “planet” and quoting one astronomer saying that the controversy “demonstrates how
belligerent and self-centered planetary astronomers can be”).
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persons—the institution of slavery 106 and cases like Buck v. Bell107 come
readily to mind.108
Justice Stevens makes precisely this sort of move in using the term
“human being” in Thornburgh. He makes precisely this kind of move when
he asserts that it is “obvious” that the state’s interest “increases
progressively and dramatically as the organism’s capacity to feel pain, to
experience pleasure, to survive, and to react to its surroundings increases
day by day.”109 Here, Justice Stevens refers to a number of characteristics
that a developing human being typically manifests over the course of his or
her development. But he does not merely refer to these attributes in a
purely descriptive manner. Rather, Stevens believes it is reasonable to
attach value to these traits. He suggests that these characteristics may carry
moral weight such that it is permissible for the state to take them into
account.
Although Justice Stevens criticizes Justice White’s characterization of
the state’s interest in limiting abortion as “protecting those who will be
citizens” as being “influenced . . . by his own value preferences,”110 Stevens
seems oblivious to the fact that he himself is expressing a value preference
both in what he says the state may take into account and what it may not.
Regardless of whether this value preference is described as “theological” or
“metaphysical,” it is mutual. It is present in both instances. It is a quality
that each judgment shares with its opposite. Both perspectives—the
perspective that sees the entity in the womb as a creature deserving of
respect and protection and the perspective that sees it as a mere thing that
may be discarded—engage in this process of valuation. In deciding how an
entity will be treated outside a given scientific discipline—how it will be
treated under the law—there is no neutral middle ground that avoids the
exercise of normative judgment.
B. Justice Stevens’ Opinion in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services
In Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, Justice Stevens sought to
bolster the claims he first made in Thornburgh. In the three years that had
passed since Thornburgh, however, a new majority had emerged on the
Court with respect to its review of abortion regulations. In Webster, this
106. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856) (concluding that under the Constitution human
beings of African descent, whether or not emancipated from slavery, were not “citizens,” “members of
the political community,” and that they “had no rights that the white man was bound to respect”).
107. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927) (upholding the power of the state to involuntarily sterilize
the mentally retarded).
108. These, of course, are not the kinds of comparisons that proponents of abortion are anxious to
draw.
109. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 778 (Stevens, J., concurring).
110. Id. at 778 n. 6.
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new majority upheld two provisions of a Missouri statute that prohibited
abortions from being performed at public facilities or by public employees
where the abortion was not necessary to save the life of the mother.111 The
Court also upheld a third portion of the statute, though without a majority
opinion. This provision required the physician performing the abortion to
make a determination of viability where the physician had reason to believe
that the fetus had attained twenty weeks gestational age.112
While Justice Stevens disapproved of all of the provisions found in the
Missouri statute under review, he took particular exception with that portion
of the statute that defined conception as, “‘the fertilization of the ovum of a
female by the sperm of a male’ . . . even though standard medical texts
equate ‘conception’ with implantation in the uterus, occurring about six
days after fertilization.” 113 Stevens feared that if such a definition were
operative, it might limit the right to contraception first established in
Griswold v. Connecticut to those methods preventing fertilization, but not
“those preventing implantation.”114 According to Justice Stevens, “[t]here
is unquestionably a theological basis for such an argument, just as there was
unquestionably a theological basis for the Connecticut statute that the Court
invalidated in Griswold. Our jurisprudence, however, has consistently
required a secular basis for valid legislation.”115 Stevens then declares that
he is “not aware of any secular basis for differentiating between
contraceptive procedures that are effective immediately before and those
that are effective immediately after fertilization.”116
If this is a true statement—if Justice Stevens is genuinely “unaware of
any secular basis for differentiating between contraceptive procedures that
are effective immediately before and those that are effective immediately
after fertilization”—then all he has succeeded in doing is to demonstrate
how exceedingly narrow the limits of his mind truly are. Science and only
science—pristine science, science shorn of any hint of religious faith—
indicates that the thing acted upon post-fertilization—a human zygote—is a
radically different kind of thing from the sperm and ovum that come
together to bring it into existence.
These differences are manifest—if in nothing else—in how science says
one should treat these distinct things if one wishes to do them harm.
Indeed, these differences are, to use a favorite word of Justice Stevens,
obvious. If you want to kill the human zygote—if you want to prevent it
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490, 507-511 (1989).
Id. at 513-522 (opinion of Rehnquist, C.J.).
Id. at 563 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part) (quoting Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.05(3)).
Id. at 565.
Id. at 565-66.
Webster, 492 U.S. at 566.
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from developing—then you prevent it from implanting in the uterine wall.
Science tells us that neither the sperm, nor the ovum, has a path of
development. They are incapable of development. Neither the sperm nor
the ovum seeks to implant itself in the uterus in order to grow, or for any
other purpose. Their only purpose is to come together to make something
new, unique, and original—a new human being. Neither the sperm nor the
ovum is “part” of this new organism. In conjoining to make the zygote they
have ceased to exist and a new life has begun—a point recognized in the
embryological texts used in the nation’s medical schools.117 That citation to
these basic scientific sources is wholly absent from Stevens’ opinion is, I
would suggest, some indication of the appalling lack of thoroughness in
Stevens’ search for the secular basis that purportedly eludes him.
Of course Justice Stevens does understand that the act of preventing the
implantation of a zygote is different from the act of preventing a sperm and
ovum from conjoining, though each act may be accomplished by use of the
same instrumentality.118 The real difference is the value placed on the thing
acted upon. Here, Justice Stevens has simply declared that placing greater
value on the human zygote than on human sperm and ova is “theological” or
“religious.” However, he has not demonstrated how this is the case. Just as
in his opinion in Thornburgh, he simply presumes it to be so. Moreover,
just as in Thornburgh, Justice Stevens does not pause to consider how his
own valuation of these entities is vulnerable to the same criticism, namely,
that it is “religious.”
Later in Webster, Justice Stevens repeats the claim he made in
Thornburgh, that the state’s interest differs as the unborn child develops:
As a secular matter, there is an obvious difference between the state
interest in protecting the freshly fertilized egg and the state interest
in protecting a 9-month-gestated, fully sentient fetus on the eve of
birth. There can be no interest in protecting the newly fertilized egg
from physical pain or mental anguish, because the capacity for such
suffering does not yet exist; respecting a developed fetus, however,
that interest is valid.119

117. See, e.g., KEITH L. MOORE, BEFORE WE ARE BORN: BASIC EMBRYOLOGY AND BIRTH
DEFECTS 23 (2nd ed. 1983) (“The zygote is the first cell of a new human being.”); KEITH MOORE &
T.V.N. PERSAUD, THE DEVELOPING HUMAN 18 (6th ed. 1998); WILLIAM J. LARSEN, HUMAN
EMBRYOLOGY 1 (3rd ed. 2001); RONAN O’RAIHILLY & FABIOLA MUELLER, HUMAN EMBRYOLOGY AND
TERATOLOGY 8 (3rd ed. 2000); SCOTT F. GILBERT, DEVELOPMENTAL BIOLOGY 185 (6th ed. 2000).
118. See Webster, 492 U.S. at 563 n. 7 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(discussing the IUV, morning after pill, and other oral contraceptives).
119. Id. at 569.
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As in Thornburgh, here Stevens highlights certain qualities that appear late
in gestation or even years after birth120 and to which Stevens attaches some
value. He does not show that these qualities—sentience, the capacity for
physical pain or mental anguish—are “secular” or that they are the only
possible basis for valuing the unborn. Once again, he has only declared it to
be the case. Even if one were to agree with this declaration, for the sake of
argument, Stevens has not demonstrated what he purports to show. That the
state has a secular interest in protecting a fetus at 9 months does not mean
that the state’s interest in protecting a fetus prior to this time—including
prior to viability—is religious. That the state may enact a law protecting 4
year olds on “secular” grounds does not mean that a law protecting 2 year
olds is “religious.”
1. Laws That Coincide with Religion: Affirming McGowan v.
Maryland and Harris v. McRae
Justice Stevens’ apparent bewilderment—his professed inability to
conceive of any “secular basis” for distinguishing between procedures that
operate before and after human fertilization—that is to say, between
contraceptive acts and abortifacient acts—serves as prologue for his critique
of the preamble to the Missouri statute at issue in Webster. The statutory
preamble set forth certain findings made by the Missouri legislature
including the proposition that “[t]he life of each human being begins at
conception,” and that “[u]nborn children have protectable interests in life,
health, and well-being.”121 Here, Stevens continues to employ the technique
of proof by declaration: “I am persuaded that the absence of any secular
purpose for the legislative declarations that life begins at conception and
that conception occurs at fertilization makes the relevant portion of the
preamble invalid under the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to
the Federal Constitution.”122
He assures us, however, that the basis for this conclusion is not “the fact
that the statement happens to coincide with the tenets of certain
religions;” 123 an assurance followed by a citation to McGowan v.
Maryland.124 In McGowan, the Court upheld a Maryland “Sunday closing”
law reasoning that the Establishment Clause “does not ban federal or state
regulation of conduct whose reason or effect merely happens to coincide or

120. The capacity to experience “mental anguish” is not a trait associated with newborn infants, or
toddlers, or even young children. It is an experience that calls for some substantial self-reflection.
121. Webster, 492 U.S. at 504.
122. Id. at 566 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
123. Id.
124. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
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harmonize with the tenets of some or all religions.”125 Under this principle,
the Court reasoned, statutes banning murder, adultery, and polygamy are
constitutional notwithstanding the fact that these prohibitions agree “with
the dictates of the Judaeo-Christian religions” and disagree with the tenets
of other religions.126 As the Court explained, “[t]he same could be said of
theft, fraud, etc., because those offenses were also proscribed in the
Decalogue.”127 In citing McGowan, Justice Stevens appears to forthrightly
embrace the notion that the agreement of law and religion with respect to a
particular proposition is not a basis for concluding that the law violates the
Establishment Clause.
This impression is immediately underscored by Justice Stevens’ citation
to the Court’s decision in Harris v. McCrae.128 If Stevens had been inclined
to challenge the application of the McGowan principle in the context of
laws that regulate abortion, Harris surely served as a strong disincentive.
The case involved a constitutional challenge to the “Hyde Amendment,” an
appropriations act prohibiting the public funding of abortions under Title
XIX of the Social Security Act. One of the arguments against the act was
that “the Hyde Amendment violates the Establishment Clause because it
incorporates into law the doctrines of the Roman Catholic Church
concerning the sinfulness of abortion and the time at which life
commences.”129 Following McGowan, the Harris court found that the Hyde
Amendment had a secular legislative purpose in that the statute was “as
much a reflection of ‘traditionalist’ values toward abortion, as it [was] an
embodiment of the views of any particular religion.”130 Thus, the majority
concluded that while “the Hyde Amendment may coincide with the
religious tenets of the Roman Catholic Church [it] does not, without more,
contravene the Establishment Clause.”131 The mere alignment of a statute
with the beliefs of a given religion is not in itself a source of constitutional
infirmity. Although Justice Stevens filed a dissent in the case, the basis of
his dissent was unrelated to the Establishment Clause. Instead, he rejected
Congress’ decision to restrict Medicaid funds to pay for abortions based
upon his broad reading of the right created by the Court in Roe.132

125. Id. at 442.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
129. Id. at 319.
130. Id. at 319.
131. Id. at 319-320. The Court did not indicate what the “something more” that, if present, would
be grounds for finding the statute to be in violation of the Establishment Clause.
132. Id. at 349-57 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Justice Stevens’ citations to McGowan and Harris in his Webster
opinion also seem to have been a somewhat belated response to Justice
White’s opinion in Thornburgh. There Justice White argued that it was
self-evident that neither the legislative decision to assert a state
interest in fetal life before viability nor the judicial decision to
recognize that interest as compelling constitutes an impermissible
“religious” decision because it coincides with the belief of one or
more religions. Certainly the fact that the prohibition of murder
coincides with one of the Ten Commandments does not render a
State’s interest in its murder statutes less than compelling, nor are
legislative and judicial decisions concerning use of the death
penalty tainted by their correspondence to varying religious views
on the subject. The simple, and perhaps unfortunate, fact of the
matter is that in determining whether to assert an interest in fetal
life, a State cannot avoid taking a position that will correspond to
some religious beliefs and contradict others.133
Justice Stevens’ opinion in Thornburgh is completely silent on this point.
At least on a rhetorical level, Stevens’ opinion in Webster seems to make
amends for this deficiency by appearing to concede the point that a law’s
mere coincidence with the religious tenets of one or another faith group
does not bring with it constitutional invalidity.
2. Washington v. Davis and the Irrelevance of Religious
Motivation
Following his citations to McGowan and Harris, Justice Stevens further
assures us that his conclusion that the Missouri statute in Webster violates
the Establishment Clause does not rest “on the fact that the legislators who
voted to enact it may have been motivated by religious considerations.” 134
He then cites to his concurrence in Washington v. Davis.135 Washington
involved the Court’s review of a test used to select candidates for the
District of Columbia’s police officer training program. To qualify for
acceptance, an applicant “was required to satisfy certain physical and
character standards, to be a high school graduate or its equivalent” and “to
receive a grade of at least 40 out of 80” on a civil service exam that “was
‘designed to test verbal ability, vocabulary, reading and comprehension.’”136
A higher percentage of blacks failed the exam than whites, and two officers
133.
134.
135.
136.

Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 795 n. 4 (1986) (White, J., dissenting).
Webster, 492 U.S. at 566 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
426 U.S. 229 (1976).
Id. at 234-235.
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filled suit claiming racial discrimination.137 Writing for the majority, Justice
White stated that the central purpose of the Equal Protection Clause was
“the prevention of official conduct discriminating on the basis of race.”138
In reviewing the Court’s prior decisions he concluded that the Court had
never held “that a law or other official act, without regard to whether it
reflects a racially discriminatory purpose, is unconstitutional solely because
it has a racially discriminatory impact.” 139 Consistent with this line of
precedent, the Court in Washington declined to hold that “a law, neutral on
its face and serving ends otherwise within the power of government to
pursue, is invalid under the Equal Protection Clause simply because it may
affect a greater proportion of one race than of another.”140
Justice Stevens filed a concurring opinion in Washington in which he
stressed that requiring proof of purposeful discrimination may involve
“differing evidentiary considerations” in different contexts.141 In citing to
this opinion in Webster, in support of his conclusion that the Missouri
statute was “religious” and that this conclusion was not based “on the fact
that the legislators who voted to enact it may have been motivated by
religious considerations,” 142 Justice Stevens likely had in mind this
observation:
It is unrealistic, on the one hand, to require the victim of alleged
discrimination to uncover the actual subjective intent of the
decisionmaker or, conversely, to invalidate otherwise legitimate
action simply because an improper motive affected the deliberation
of a participant in the decisional process. A law conscripting clerics
should not be invalidated because an atheist voted for it.143
Plainly, Justice Stevens recognizes that discovering the motive of even a
single lawmaker may, as a practical matter, prove to be exceedingly
difficult. These practical challenges are further complicated by the fact that
identifying the motive behind a law is not like pointing to a simple fact laid
bare since laws and other official governmental actions are “frequently the
product of compromise, of collective decisionmaking, and of mixed
motivation.”144

137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

Id. at 235.
Id. at 239.
Id. (emphasis original).
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. at 242.
Id. at 253 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Webster, 492 U.S. at 566 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Washington, 426 U.S. at 253 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Id.
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Beyond these practical and theoretical concerns—even when
governmental motive can be identified—it seems that Stevens does not see
motive as the touchstone of unconstitutionality, and with good reason. The
motives behind even a single vote may, as Stevens says, be “mixed” and of
an almost infinite variety.145 What really matters is the substance of what is
enacted, not why a particular legislator was inspired to vote in support of a
measure. What is “relevant is the legislative purpose of the statute, not the
possibly religious motives of the legislators who enacted the law.”146 As
Andrew Koppelman has put it, what really matters are “legislative outcomes
rather than legislative inputs,” 147 what the duly enacted law says and
accomplishes, 148 not the motivation behind the act of voting. 149
145. A lawmaker may be motivated to vote for a piece of legislation because, after reviewing the
legislation, conferring with his constituents, and deliberating over the matter with his legislative
colleagues, he concludes that the bill is right and just, that it will contribute to the common good and so
ought to become law. By contrast a lawmaker may vote for the legislation because the party whip
pressures him to do so; or to avoid a primary challenge in the next election from one or the other wing of
his party; or because a majority of his constituents favor the bill even though he thinks it unwise; or
because some wealthy donor-constituents urge him to do so; or (more boldly) because he receives a
bribe to do so; or because of some “logrolling” or “backscratching” arrangements with other legislators
in which he agrees to support the bill in exchange for their support on some other proposed legislation;
or because the legislation coincides with his religious faith or that of his constituents and will advance
what they believe is God’s will; or some combination of all these things. Even if the lawmaker’s
motivations were utterly corrupt, even if he was guilty of a crime—motivated by the payment of a bribe
in voting for a law—so long as the law satisfied the constitutional requirements for enactment (e.g.
majority bicameral support and presentment) this would not constitute grounds for voiding the law. See
Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
The validity of a law cannot be questioned because undue influence may have been used in
obtaining it. However improper it may be, and however severely the offenders may be
punished, if guilty of bribery, yet the grossest corruption will not authorize a judicial tribunal
in disregarding the law. This would open a source of litigation which could never be closed.
Id. Legislatures and other lawmaking bodies do not enact motives. They enact statutes and other laws,
and it is these products of the lawmaking process that must withstand constitutional scrutiny, not the
often complex motives of those who participate in that process.
146. Westside Community Bd. of Ed. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 249 (1990).
147. Andrew Koppelman, Secular Purpose, 88 VA. L. REV. 87, 118 (2002); see also PAUL
HORWITZ, THE AGNOSTIC AGE: LAW, RELIGION, AND THE CONSTITUTION 268-270 (2011) (arguing from
the perspective of “constitutional agnosticism” with respect to religious truth that there can be “no bar to
religious participation in public debate, including the use of explicitly religious arguments by citizens
and lawmakers” but “there are important restrictions on particular outcomes” such that the state “may
not make official statements that take sides on questions of religious truth”).
148. The meaning of legislation may also be understood in terms of what it actually
accomplishes—its effect in the world. In his concurrence in Washington v. Davis, Justice Stevens
observed that “[f]requently the most probative evidence of intent will be objective evidence of what
actually happened rather than evidence describing the subjective state of mind of the actor” since
“normally the actor is presumed to have intended the natural consequences of his deeds.” Washington,
426 U.S. at 253 (Stevens, J., concurring). On this account, a facially neutral statute can be shown to be a
product of racially discriminatory intent on an empirical basis (i.e. disparate impact). There is, however,
no comparable metric for the impact of an allegedly religious law that serves as proof of the purported
religious intent behind it. Proof of intent differs in the two cases in that race is introduced into the
analysis of the racially-neutral law by use of empirical data showing a disparate impact on the members
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Accordingly, just as Justice Stevens’ hypothetical conscription law is not
invalid because the atheist lawmaker is motivated to vote for the measure
out of anti-religious zeal (i.e. a desire to see clerics pressed into military
service), so the law restricting abortion in Webster is not invalid because the
Christian lawmaker is motivated to support the measure out of religious zeal
(i.e. a desire to prevent the death and destruction of the tiniest human souls
created by God).
of an identified racial group, whereas religion is not introduced into the analysis of a religiously-neutral
law by any empirical proof of what the law has accomplished. This can only be done by way of
assumption, and assumption is not proof. In the case of a law restricting abortion, it cannot be the case
that the “objective evidence of what actually happened”—that a woman was discouraged from an
abortion, or found it more difficult to obtain one—constitutes “probative evidence” of an intent to
“establish religion” without first assuming this intent, that is, without first assuming what this objective
evidence is offered to show. If a law that prohibits gambling, or prostitution, or polygamy is effective,
then there will be “objective evidence” showing that the law has a “disparate impact” on individuals who
wish to engage in these activities, but these sorts of statistics will not be “probative evidence” of a
religious purpose behind these laws. The would-be gambler, prostitute or polygamist may convincingly
show that he or she disagrees with the normative judgment embodied in the law, but this disagreement,
however plain it may be, will not show that the government’s normative judgment is religious, only that
some portion of the public does not agree with it.
After its decision in Washington v. Davis, the Supreme Court later clarified what a plaintiff
must do to show that a facially neutral law that has a disparate impact on an identifiable group is
discriminatory in a way that violates the Equal Protection Clause. See, e.g., Arlington Heights v. Metro.
Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 232, 266-268 (1977) (holding that plaintiffs may show invidious
discriminatory purpose through the impact in “a clear pattern, unexplainable on grounds other than
race,” or through “[d]epartures from the normal procedural sequence” of decision-making, or through the
contemporary statements of lawmakers set forth in “legislative or administrative history”); Personnel
Administrator of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (holding that lawmaker’s mere awareness
of disparate impact is not sufficient to show discriminatory purpose; plaintiff must show that the
legislature “selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part ‘because of’ not ‘in spite
of,’ its adverse effects upon an identifiable group”). To the extent that racially-neutral laws are thought
to be analogous to religiously-neutral laws, such that discriminatory purpose in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause in the case of the former and religious purpose in violation of the Establishment
Clause in the case of the latter can be shown through empirical proof of the impact of each law, these
subsequent cases make proof of religious purpose even more difficult to sustain.
149. A comprehensive argument in support of the views set forth in this paragraph is beyond the
scope of this essay. Briefly put, however, one may examine a statute or ordinance in light of the
Establishment Clause by (1) reviewing the motive of one or more lawmakers in enacting the law, (2) the
language of the act itself, (3) the intent or purpose behind of the legislation, and (4) the effect that the
law has in the world. All but the first of these can be derived from the Supreme Court’s much criticized
but still frequently invoked Lemon test. Cf. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-613 (1971) (for a
statute to satisfy the demands of the Establishment Clause it must “have a secular legislative purpose,”
that its “principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion,” and that it
“must not foster ‘an excessive government entanglement with religion’”). Interpreting the language used
and construing the purpose (the “legislative intent”) behind this language is an unavoidable part of the
hermeneutic task confronting every court. In fulfilling this task, a court may or may not consult the
legislative history of the statute, but when it does, the aim of this inquiry is to understand the meaning of
the language employed—to construe the legislative outcome. The point is not to discern the reasons
why a legislator voted for the statute—the operative incentives and disincentives in legislative
machinations—to fixate on legislative inputs. The proper subject of this inquiry is what was said
(meaning) not why it was said (motive). Motive may explain how a certain meaning came to be adopted,
not what that meaning is. It is this meaning that must conform to the Constitution, not the calculus
worked out inside each legislator’s head as he or she decides to vote for or against a proposed statute.
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3. The Covert Repudiation of McGowan and Harris Under the
Endorsement Test
So if, as Justice Stevens says, the statutory preamble to the Missouri
statute at issue in Webster is not “religious” because the legislative
statement that life begins at conception “happens to coincide with the tenets
of certain religions” (following McGowan and Harris), or because “the
legislators who voted to enact it may have been motivated by religious
considerations” (as per his opinion in Washington v. Davis), then what is it
that renders the law “religious” and unconstitutional?
Having overtly rejected these weak though plausible routes to his
conclusion, Justice Stevens then covertly seeks to reinstate them. At this
point in the opinion Stevens makes a rather astonishing claim. He says that
his conclusion that the Missouri statute violates the Establishment Clause
“rests on the fact that the preamble, an unequivocal endorsement of a
religious tenet of some but by no means all Christian faiths, serves no
identifiable secular purpose” and that this “fact alone compels a conclusion
that the statute violates the Establishment Clause,”150 citing for support his
majority opinion in Wallace v. Jaffree.151
This statement, which serves as the linchpin for Stevens’ entire Webster
opinion, is remarkable in many respects, none of which are a credit to its
author. First, one might say, candidly though somewhat uncharitably, that
Justice Stevens seems unaware that he has contradicted himself. That is,
Stevens says in effect that the preamble statements—that “[t]he life of each
human being begins at conception” and that “[u]nborn children have
protectable interests in life, health and well-being”—are not religious
because they happen to coincide with the beliefs of a particular religion
(citing McGowan and Harris), except that they are in fact religious because
they are the religious tenets “of some but by no means all Christian
faiths.”152
a. Proving the Religious Nature of the Thing Endorsed
Stevens claims that the State of Missouri has “unequivocally” endorsed
a “religious tenet” in its statute regulating abortion, meaning that both the
endorsement and the religious character of the thing endorsed are in no way
open to doubt. His use of the term “endorsement” in refering to the
Missouri statute and his citation to Wallace v. Jaffree are at best a cryptic
invocation of the so-called “endorsement test,” a means of assessing alleged
150. Webster, 492 U.S. at 566-67 (internal citations omitted).
151. 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
152. Webster, 492 U.S. at 566.
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violations of the Establishment Clause first introduced by Justice Sandra
Day O’Connor in her concurring opinion in Lynch v. Donnelly.153 From the
time of O’Connor’s opinion in Lynch to the present day, the endorsement
test has been the focus of substantial criticism, both by academic
commentators and by other members of the Court. 154 Putting these
criticisms to one side, however, and assuming the test’s applicability, one
cannot even entertain the question of “whether the government intends to
convey a message of endorsement or disapproval of religion” 155 without
first showing that the thing endorsed or disapproved is “religious.”
Defining “religion” and the quality of being “religious” has proven to
be a notoriously difficult, even illusive task for scholars.156 The Supreme
Court has largely succeeded in avoiding the question by resisting the urge to
set forth an authoritative definition of “religion” under the Constitution.
This is somewhat surprising given that the word “religion” is part of the
constitutional text, and the Court has not been able to follow a similar path
of avoidance with respect to defining other constitutional terms such as
“speech,” “search and seizure,” and “due process.” The question of
defining “religion” has arisen more often in the context of the Free Exercise
Clause157 than in the case of the Establishment Clause. As Steve Smith
notes, because Establishment Clause cases typically involve some form of
governmental support for institutions that claim a religious identity, 158
courts have been able to avoid the problem of definition by relying upon
153. 465 U.S. 668, 687-694 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
154. For academic criticism of the endorsement test, see Steven D. Smith, Symbols, Perceptions,
and Doctrinal Illusions: Establishment Neutrality and the “No Endorsement” Test, 86 MICH. L. REV.
266 (1987); Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. Chi. L. Rev. 115, 147157 (1992). For criticism of the endorsement test by other members of the Court, see County of
Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 668-677 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part).
155. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. at 691.
156. Jesse H. Choper, Defining “Religion” in the First Amendment, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 579;
George C. Freeman, III, The Misguided Search for the Constitutional Definition of “Religion”, 71
GEORGETOWN L. J. 1519 (1983); Kent Greenawalt, Religion as a Concept in Constitutional Law, 72
CAL. L. REV. 753 (1984); Stanley Ingber, Religion or Ideology: A Needed Clarification of the Religion
Clauses, 41 STAN. L. REV. 233 (1989); Eduardo Peñalver, Note, The Concept of Religion, 107 YALE L.
J. 791 (1997); Jeffrey L. Oldham, Note, Constitutional “Religion”: A Survey of First Amendment
Definitions of Religion, 6 TEX. F. ON C.L. & C.R. 117 (2001).
157. See, e.g., United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965); Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333
(1970); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
158. See, e.g., Larkin v. Grendel’s Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116 (1982) (law giving church veto power
over granting of alcoholic beverage licenses); Bd. of Ed. of Kiryas Joel Village v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687
(1993) (creation of special school district for followers of Jewish sect); Grand Rapids School Dist. v.
Ball, 474 U.S. 373 (1985) (program involving public school teachers providing remedial education at
religious schools), overruled, Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997); Lemon, 403 U.S. 602 (state
program providing salary supplements to parochial school teachers); Zorach v. Clausen, 343 U.S. 306
(1952) (program involving release time for public school students to attend religious classes off site);
Everson v. Bd. of Ed. of Township of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1 (1946) (state payment of transportation costs
for children to and from religious school).
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relatively uncontroversial views of what is “religious” and what is “secular”
that “correspond to conventional views held by people in the community.”
159
The Court has likewise been able to avoid defining “religion” in cases
involving challenges to government-sponsored activities that nearly
everyone regards as unquestionably religious, such as prayer and devotional
Bible reading.160 By contrast, in Free Exercise Clause cases courts must
often grapple with an individual’s claims of what is “religious” that lie
outside this consensus or are otherwise controversial. 161 Because the
endorsement test focuses on the claimed perception of government support
for things that may fall outside the conventional understanding of what is
“religious” it forces courts to confront the definitional question directly as
never before.162
Under the endorsement test, as first articulated by Justice O’Connor in
Lynch and as refined in subsequent opinions, there are two ways in which
the “religious” nature of the thing endorsed can be shown, namely, through
proof of government intent or through proof of what some observer
perceives the government’s actions to be.
i. Finding Religion in the Government’s Intent
First, one can show that the government intended to endorse something
that it acknowledges as “religious.” Justice O’Connor refers to this as the
“subjective” meaning of a statement, one that “depends on the intention of
the speaker.” 163 There are, of course, a host of well-known practical
challenges attendant to any attempt to discern a single, coherent intent from
a collective body by examining the text of the statute or resolution adopted,
in the context in which it appears, together with any legislative history that

159. Smith, supra note 154, at 296-97.
160. See, e.g., Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (recitation of “nondenominational” prayer
composed by school board); Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (reading of Bible
passages and recitation of the Lord’s Prayer); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (clergy-delivered
prayers at public school graduations); Santa Fe Independent School Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000)
(student council chaplain delivering prayer before public high school football games).
161. See, e.g., Africa v. Pennsylvania, 662 F. 2d 1025 (3rd Cir. 1981) (whether the MOVE
movement constituted a religion entitling adherent to special diet in prison); Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F. 2d
197 (3rd Cir. 1979) (whether course on transcendental meditation in public high school was teaching
religion); United States v. Meyers, 95 F. 3d. 1475 (10th Cir. 1996) (rejecting claim defendant’s claim the
Church of Marijuana was a religion that commanded him to use, possess, and distribute the drug for the
benefit of mankind and the planet earth); Founding Church of Scientology of Washington, D.C. v.
United States, 409 F. 2d 1146 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (concluding the Founding Church of Scientology is a
religion); Glenside Center, Inc. v. Abington Township Zoning Hearing Bd., 973 A. 2d 10 (Pa. Commw.
2009) (use of space for Alcoholics Anonymous meeting not constitute exercise of religion).
162. See Smith, supra note 154, at 299.
163. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
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might be available.164 There may be no legislative history that speaks to the
point of legislative intent. Where there is, the legislature or other
governmental actor may “express[] a plausible secular purpose” for its
action and may even “disclaim[] an intent” to convey a message of
endorsement of religion.165 In such a case “courts should generally defer to
that stated intent.”166 At the same time, it is “possible that a legislature will
enunciate a sham secular purpose,” in which case the court hearing the
matter is free to ignore the stated intent and discern the “sincere one.”167
Although the Court gives no indication as to when a judge may abandon the
stated purpose as a sham and begin his or her search for the real one, the
Court has expressed its confidence in the ability of judges to distinguish one
from the other.168 What is less clear is whether the governmental act that
constitutes a prohibited endorsement of religion must be “entirely motivated
by a purpose to advance religion,”169 or if instead the religious purpose may
simply “predominate”170 over some legitimate, secular purpose, and if so by
how much. It is clear, however, that when a judge wants to affirm the
government’s stated purpose or dismiss it as mere subterfuge he or she may
invoke any number of conclusory expressions that appear throughout this
line of cases: “evident purpose,” 171 “preeminent purpose,” 172 “primary
purpose,”173 “manifest objective,”174 “commonsense conclusion.”175
Obviously a great deal more could be said about governmental intent
and the endorsement of religion. The problem is that Justice Stevens’
statement that the Missouri statute under review in Webster constituted “an
unequivocal endorsement of a religious tenet” is that it is only a conclusion.
164. See Smith, supra note 154, at 284-285; B. Jessie Hill, Putting Religious Symbolism in
Context: A Linguistic Critique of the Endorsement Test, 104 MICH. L. REV. 491, 503 (2005).
165. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 74 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
166. Id. at 74-75; see also Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 308 (“When a governmental entity professes a
secular purpose for an arguably religious policy, the government’s characterization is, of course, entitled
to some deference. But it is nonetheless the duty of courts to ‘distinguis[h] a sham secular purpose from
a sincere one.’”) (quoting Wallace, 474 U.S. at 75).
167. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 75; cf. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41 (1980) (prohibiting the display
of the Ten Commandments in public school classrooms and insisting that “no legislative recitation of a
supposed secular purpose can blind us” to the religious quality of the display).
168. See Wallace, 472 U.S. at 75.
169. Id. at 56.
170. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 599 (Powell, J., concurring, joined by O’Connor, J.) (“A
religious purpose alone is not enough to invalidate an act of a state legislature. The religious purpose
must predominate.”); see also id. at 614 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing authority providing that legislation
may be struck down on Establishment Clause grounds only if it is “wholly” or “entirely” or “solely”
motivated by religious considerations).
171. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 668 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
172. Edwards, 482 U.S. at 591.
173. Id. at 593, 594.
174. McCreary County v. ACLU of Kentucky, 545 U.S. 844, 855 (2005).
175. Id. at 863.
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Stevens offers nothing by way of any citation to the legislative history of the
act.176 He offers nothing that can rightly be called analysis of the legislative
text. He offers his conclusion and only his conclusion that the language of
the statue “serves no identifiable secular purpose.”177
(A) Wallace v. Jaffree and Dismissing the Government’s
Alleged Secular Purpose
In Wallace v. Jaffree, a decision authored by Justice Stevens and cited
by him in his Webster opinion, Stevens showed a determined ingenuity in
finding legislative intent of a religious nature where others might not. In
Wallace the Court applied the endorsement test to strike down an Alabama
statute that authorized a one minute period of silence “for meditation or
voluntary prayer” at the beginning of each school day.178 Alabama already
had in place a statute that authorized a one minute period of silence “for
meditation,” a statute that the district court upheld and that the parties
agreed was constitutional. 179 Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens
concluded that the purpose of the statute was to endorse religion, finding
that “[t]he addition of [the phrase] ‘or voluntary prayer’ indicates that the
State intended to characterize prayer as a favored practice.” 180 This
conclusion was surprising in part because of the high standard for
invalidation that the Court set forth. Relying on Justice O’Connor’s
concurrence in Lynch, Justice Stevens said that in applying the purpose
prong of the Lemon test “it is appropriate to ask ‘whether the government’s
actual purpose is to endorse or disapprove of religion.’”181 But it is not
enough that this purpose simply be present. It must be comprehensive. A
statute that is “motivated in part by a religious purpose” is not for that
reason unconstitutional in that “the First Amendment requires that a statute
must be invalidated if it is entirely motivated by a purpose to advance
religion.”182
Notwithstanding this seemingly exacting standard, the Court struck
down the Alabama statute finding that it was affirmatively supported by a
religious purpose, namely, “to convey a message of state approval of prayer

176. By way of contrast, the majority, concurring and (most especially) dissenting opinions made
numerous citations to the legislative history behind the Louisiana statute at issue in the case. See
Edwards, 482 U.S. at 587, 591-592; id. at 599-600 (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 619-626, 629-633
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
177. Webster, 492 U.S. at 566-567 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
178. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 75.
179. Id. at 40-41.
180. Id. at 60.
181. Id. at 56.
182. Id.
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activities in the public schools.” 183 Justice Stevens located this illicit
religious intent in two post-enactment statements by a single legislator.184
Stevens offered no reason—no argument—as to why it was appropriate to
assume that the post-hoc comments of this one lawmaker represented the
views of the entire Alabama legislature. His libertine assumption in this
regard simply “underscor[es] the factual and conceptual problems of
ascertaining the intent of a collective body.”185
As “troublesome” as this conclusion was,186 even more disturbing was
the Wallace court’s conclusion that the statute “was not motivated by any
clearly secular purpose,” that “the statute had no secular purpose.”187 This
was disturbing because two plausible secular purposes were plainly before
the Court. As Justice White noted in his dissent, the statute authorizing a
one minute period of silence “for meditation or voluntary prayer” may have
been enacted notwithstanding the presence of another statute already in
place providing for a one minute period of silence “for meditation” in order
to make clear that a student could in fact use the time for prayer.188 This
clarification is all the more plausible if read within the wider cultural
context of the cessation of prayer in the public schools as ordered by the
Supreme Court. 189 Although the Court had elsewhere made clear that
students do not “shed their constitutional rights . . . at the schoolhouse
gate,” 190 many read the Court’s Establishment Clause decisions as
manifesting a “latent hostility toward religion,” “sending a clear message of
disapproval,” and “requir[ing] a relentless extirpation of all contact between
government and religion.”191 In later decisions the Court would uphold the
practice of voluntary, organized prayer by students in a public school

183. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 61.
184. Id. at 56-57 (quoting Senator Donald Holmes in a statement entered into the legislative record
after the statute was enacted, and testimony by the same individual given at the preliminary injunction
hearing on the statute held in the district court).
185. Smith, supra note 154, at 284-285.
186. In her opinion concurring in the judgment, Justice O’Connor criticized the majority opinion
remarking that it was “particularly troublesome to denigrate an expressed secular purpose due to
postenactment testimony of particular legislators or by interested persons who witnessed the drafting of
the statute.” Wallace, 472 U.S. at 75 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment); see also id. at 77
(saying that she “would give little, if any, weight to this sort of evidence of legislative intent”). Justice
O’Connor nevertheless concluded that the purpose of the statute was “to convey a message of state
encouragement and endorsement of religion.” Id. at 78.
187. Id. at 56.
188. Id. at 91 (White, J., dissenting).
189. See Engle, 370 U.S. 421; see Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
190. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969)
(addressing students’ right to freedom of speech and allowing students protesting the Vietnam War to
wear black arm bands).
191. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 657 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part).
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setting.192 But the statute in Wallace was enacted prior to these decisions—
prior to the Court’s reassurance that “nothing in the Constitution as
interpreted by this Court prohibits any public school student from
voluntarily praying at any time before, during, or after the schoolday.”193 In
this context, a state could concede the correctness of the Court’s decision in
Engle v. Vitale194 forbidding state-sponsored school prayer, and at the same
time wish to clarify that private, voluntary prayer was not so obnoxious to
the order of public education that it could not be undertaken in a moment of
silence at the beginning of the school day.
Second, the statute at issue in Wallace did more than add the words “or
voluntary prayer” to the already existent statute authorizing a period of
silence for “mediation.” The challenged statute also expanded the scope of
the earlier act. Whereas the “meditation” statute applied only to grades one
through six, the “meditation or voluntary prayer” statute applied to “all
grades,” that is, grades one through twelve.195 The purpose of making the
admittedly constitutional period of silence available to a greater number of
students is plainly secular and may have been “the statute’s primary
objective, with the words ‘meditation or voluntary prayer’ added to clarify a
point that the earlier statute failed to address.” 196 In response to this
purpose, the majority, through Justice Stevens, offered a shallow,
dissembling and grossly misleading argument. Stevens asserted that this
difference was “of no relevance”197 because of none the plaintiff children in
the case were in the new grades to which the revised law applied. But the
ages of the Jaffree children had nothing to do with the judicial
determination of legislative intent. On the contrary, the expansion of the
minute of silence to grades seven through twelve speaks to a plausible
secular purpose behind the new law. Rather than confront this purpose
directly, Stevens simply ignored it.
The wanton ease and prevarication with which the Court dismissed the
plausible secular reasons explaining the statute at issue in Wallace do not
inspire confidence. Notwithstanding the Court’s language in Wallace and
elsewhere suggesting judicial deference to plausible statements of secular
legislative purpose and an unwillingness to strike down laws that enjoy
some secular purpose, it seems that when the Court is determined to find
“no secular purpose,”198 none will be found and the law in question will be
192. See Westside Community Bd., 496 U.S. 226; Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free
School District, 508 U.S. 384 (1993).
193. Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 313.
194. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
195. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 58.
196. Smith, supra note 154, at 285.
197. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 59.
198. Id. at 56.
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voided. This is not, of course, a weakness peculiar to the endorsement test.
An inconvenient element can always be gotten around by a clever judge
determined to reach the result he knows is right. In Wallace and in Webster,
Justice Stevens dispenses with the cleverness and simply declares the test
satisfied: an absence of secular purpose.
(B) Not Much Effort: Justice Stevens and the Easily
Identifiable Secular Purpose in Webster
Had Justice Stevens wished to investigate the possibility of a plausible
secular legislative purpose behind the legislation at issue in Webster, he
need not have looked far. Indeed, discerning the purpose behind the
preamble would have demanded very little effort. In its brief before the
Court, the State of Missouri made clear that the legislature’s purpose was to
set forth “the established biological fact that the life of an individual human
being . . . begins at conception.”199 The State acknowledged that “it is of no
consequence whether a legislature or court pronounces as true or false a fact
of nature” as it will be true in any case, but that “it is not improper for a
government or a court to recite findings in making or interpreting law.”200
Indeed, the prefatory section to the statute “constitutes an effort by the
General Assembly of Missouri to recognize a truth justifying the substantive
legislation that follows.”201 In its reply brief Missouri further explained that
the provisions Justice Stevens finds objectionable “simply explain why the
State of Missouri chooses to regulate abortion to the full extent permitted by
this Court’s abortion precedents.” 202 Plainly, a plausible account for the
statutory language was readily at hand. Rather than attempt to prove that
this stated purpose was a mere “sham” by citations to legislative history or
other proof, Justice Stevens instead chose to ignore it. In its place he
supposes an illicit purpose of his own invention.

199. Brief of Appellants, Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989) (No. 88605) 1989 WL 1127643 at 26. Missouri cited a number of medical texts in support of this empirical
claim. In the court below, the Eighth Circuit thought that the best response to Missouri’s contention was
no response at all. That is, in response to Missouri’s argument that the Roe court was mistaken in its
declaration that science has not resolved the question of when human begins the Court of Appeals did
not engage the scientific literature presented. Instead it simply said: “We see no point in addressing this
contention.” Reproductive Health Services v. Webster, 871 F. 2d 1071, 1076 n. 7 (8 th Cir. 1988).
Apparently the plaintiffs in the case did not wish to debate the science behind the State’s findings. This
can be gleaned from the fact that the plaintiffs filed a “motion in limine prohibiting the defendants from
presenting any testimony or evidence regarding the constitutionality of §§ 1.205.1(1) or 1.205.1(2)”
which the district court granted. Brief of Appellants, supra note 199, at 3.
200. Brief of Appellants, supra note 199, at 26.
201. Id. at 26-27.
202. Reply Brief of Appellants, Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989)
(No. 88-605) 1989 WL 1115242 at 11.
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This is perhaps the most pitiable aspect of Justice Stevens’ opinion in
Webster. It is not just that Stevens fails to demonstrate a “religious” intent
on the part of the Missouri legislature under the endorsement test, but that
he seems unable to tell the difference between making an argument and
announcing a conclusion. That is, Justice Stevens says that he is “persuaded
that the absence of any secular purpose for the legislative declarations that
life begins at conception . . . makes the relevant portion of the preamble
invalid under the Establishment Clause” and that “[t]his conclusion [sic] . . .
rests on the fact that the preamble . . . serves no identifiable secular
purpose.”203 Justice Stevens is an intelligent man and so one may presume
he knows what a syllogism is. He must know the difference between
making an argument in support of a conclusion and simply declaring a
proposition to be true. He must know that “repetition” is not a synonym for
“proof,” “demonstration,” or “argument,” but on the face of his opinion one
would be hard pressed to see that Stevens grasps the difference.
ii. Finding Religion in the Perception of the Reasonable
Observer
The second way in which something can be shown to be “religious”
under the endorsement test is to look at what Justice O’Connor referred to in
Lynch as “the ‘objective’ meaning of [a] statement in the community.”204
That is, some members of the public will not try to discern the
government’s intent to endorse religion “by examining the context of the
statement or asking questions of the speaker.”205 They will instead rely “on
the words themselves.” 206 Admittedly, the meaning received by such a
person may be quite different from that which was “actually intended” by
the speaker.207
When Justice O’Connor first set forth the endorsement test, her
formulation of the test in this manner immediately raised the critical
question “Whose perceptions count?”208 In a series of subsequent opinions,
O’Connor later clarified that the individual interpreting the government’s
action was not an actual person but a judicially crafted heuristic norm, an
203. Webster, 492 U.S. at 566-567 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
204. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Smith, supra note 154, at 291; see also McConnell, supra note 154, at 150-151 (arguing that
what constitutes “endorsement” depends upon a person’s intuitions as to where the line should be drawn
between religion and state and that the concept of endorsement “detracts from the analysis” and “serves
only to mask reliance on untutored intuition”); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
1293 (2d. ed. 1988) (“When deciding whether a state practice makes someone feel like an outsider, the
result often turns on whether one adopts the perspective of an outsider or that of an insider.”).
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“objective observer” 209 or “reasonable observer”210 who is knowledgeable
about the official act under review.211 For Justice O’Connor “[t]o ascertain
whether [a] statute conveys a message of endorsement, the relevant issue is
how it would be perceived by an objective observer, acquainted with the
text, legislative history, and implementation of the statute.”212 By investing
the reasonable observer with this background knowledge, O’Connor largely
resolves the possible tension between the “objective” and “subjective”
meanings of government action that she described in Lynch. Indeed, such a
reasonable observer would be so sensitive as to “take into account the
values underlying the Free Exercise Clause in assessing” whether a
challenged government accommodation to an otherwise applicable law
“conveyed a message of endorsement.”213
While Justice Stevens has embraced the endorsement test as a means of
assessing alleged Establishment Clause violations, he has also criticized
O’Connor’s “reasonable observer” for being overly sophisticated—an
“ultrareasonable observer”214 that impairs the purpose for which the test was
devised. In Capital Square Review and Advisory Board v. Pinette, the
Court, without a majority opinion, held that the government could not deny
the Ku Klux Klan a permit to exhibit a large unattended Latin cross in the
plaza across from the Ohio State Capitol. In his dissenting opinion, Justice
Stevens ridiculed Justice O’Connor’s “reasonable observer” as “a wellschooled jurist, a being finer than the tort-law model” of the reasonable
person.215 For Stevens, the problem with envisioning such a keen and wellinformed observer was that such a construct limited the reach of the
endorsement test. It strips away constitutional protection under the
Establishment Clause from “every reasonable person whose knowledge
happens to fall below some ‘ideal’ standard.”216 In place of O’Connor’s
highly sophisticated observer, Stevens proposed a man of the street, the
casual “passerby, including schoolchildren, traveling salesmen, and
tourists” all of whom are “members of the body politic” and so “equally
209. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 76 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
210. County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 631 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
211. Indeed, Justice O’Connor explicitly rejected the idea that “the endorsement test should focus
on the actual perception of individual observers, who naturally have differing degrees of knowledge.”
Her reasonable observer is “more informed than the casual passerby.” Capitol Square Review and
Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 777 (1995) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment).
212. Corporation of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 348 (1987) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring in the judgment)
213. County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 632.
214. Capitol Square, 515 U.S. 753, 807 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
215. Id. at 800 n. 5.
216. Id.
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entitled to be free of government endorsement of religion.”217 Under this
less demanding standard “it is enough that some reasonable observers would
attribute a religious message to the State.”218 Such a revised standard may
well lower the bar sufficiently that many more laws would be open to
Establishment Clause challenge since, as Justice O’Connor observes,
“[t]here is always someone who, with a quantum of knowledge, reasonably
might perceive a particular action as an endorsement of religion.”219 Justice
Stevens dismissed these concerns in Capitol Square since the apprehension
of endorsement must still be “objectively reasonable” such that someone
“who view[ed] an exotic cow at the zoo as a symbol of the government’s
approval of the Hindu religion cannot survive this test.”220
Again, much more could be said about the “reasonable observer” aspect
of the endorsement test, how the concept should be defined, and even
whether it should be part of our jurisprudence. The problem with the
“reasonable observer” with respect to Justice Stevens’ opinion in Webster is
that it allows Stevens to do covertly that which he expressly denies. It
allows him to publicly affirm the principle recognized by the Court in
McGowan v. Maryland and Harris v. McRae while reaching a result that in
fact repudiates this principle.
Under the reasonable observer aspect of the endorsement test—whether
Justice O’Connor’s well-schooled version or Justice Stevens’ more
pedestrian model—the religious character of the thing endorsed is a
function of the reasonable observer’s perception. That is to say, the
reasonable observer is an observer, not a participant. He or she does not
invest the image, place, object or text with special significance. The
observer does not regard the thing in question as sacred or normative, but
observes others doing so. Thus, the reasonable observer’s perception that
something is “religious” is not a direct interpretation of the thing itself but a
response to how other people—religious believers—interpret the thing in
question.
The depiction of a woman and her infant son huddled together is not
inherently religious. Rather, it is “religious” because some believers—
Christians—see it as an image of the “Madonna and Child,” Jesus Christ
and his mother, Mary. To the non-believer, a lampstand with seven lights
may appear to be only a decorative candelabrum, but for a believing Jew it
is a “menorah,” a symbol of the faith and a reminder of the light given to
God’s people in the Torah. For a Hindu, the Bhagavad Gita is not simply
217. Id. at 808 n. 14.
218. Id. at 807.
219. Capitol Square, 515 U.S. at 780 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
220. Id. at 808 n. 14 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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an account of the battlefield exchange between a warrior-prince and his
charioteer but a source of divine wisdom, a text whose verses are chanted as
mantras. And for those who follow Islam, the Kaaba in Mecca is not simply
an ancient cube structure made of granite, but a place of pilgrimage—the
first place where Allah was worshiped, built by Abraham and later purified
by Mohammad, the very place where heaven and earth meet.
In each case the reasonable observer’s perception of religiosity is
derivative. It is derived from the fact that a community of religious
believers regards the image, place, object or text as religious—they invest it
with special meaning and hold it in high regard as something sacred,
deserving of care, reverence and devotion, worthy of imitation, and
normative for the life of a believer within the faith tradition. In other words,
a thing is perceived as religious precisely for the reasons that Stevens
ostensibly rejects in Webster and which the Court disavowed in McGowan
v. Maryland and Harris v. McRae, namely that it “happens to coincide with
the tenets of certain religions.”221
In Harris, the Court concluded that “the fact that the funding
restrictions in the Hyde Amendment may coincide with the religious tenets
of the Roman Catholic Church does not, without more, contravene the
Establishment Clause.”222 The fact of mere coincidence was insufficient for
the law to violate the anti-establishment principle—“something more” was
required. While the Harris court did not indicate what this “something
more” was, the endorsement test provides a plausible answer: It is the act of
endorsement itself.
(A) Defining Government “Endorsement”
Somewhat surprisingly, however, what it is precisely that makes a
government action qualify as an “endorsement” is far from clear.223 This
lack of clarity is odd given the centrality of governmental “endorsement” in
the endorsement test—that is, as the very act that the Constitution
presumably prohibits. In Wallace v. Jaffree, Justice Stevens offered that an
endorsement is not the act of government “acknowledging a religion” or
“taking religion into account in making law and policy” but the act of
government “conveying or attempting to convey a message that religion or a
particular religious belief is favored or preferred.” 224 In County of
Allegheny v. ACLU Justice Blackmun noted that “the word ‘endorsement’ is
221. Webster, 492 U.S. at 566 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
222. Harris, 448 U.S. at 319-320.
223. Smith, supra note 154, at 276-283 (identifying four distinct possible meanings of
“endorsement”).
224. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 70 (1985).
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not self-defining,” and so he looked to “other words that th[e] Court ha[d]
found useful over the years in interpreting the Establishment Clause.”225 He
concluded, however that “[w]hether the key word is ‘endorsement,’
‘favoritism,’ or ‘promotion,’ the essential principle remains the same,”
namely, that “[t]he Establishment Clause, at the very least, prohibits
government from appearing to take a position on questions of religious
belief or from ‘making adherence to a religion relevant in any way to a
person’s standing in the political community.’”226
To the extent that the endorsement test is desirable at all, it is perhaps
best suited to cases involving displays of religious imagery and symbols—a
point that some justices may, of late, have come to recognize.227 As noted
above, the test first appeared in Lynch v. Donnelly, a case involving a cityowned Christmas display of Santa Claus and his sleigh, reindeer and candystriped poles, together with a nativity scene that included the traditional
figures of “the Infant Jesus, Mary and Joseph, angels, shepherds, kings and
animals.”228 In her concurrence introducing the endorsement test, Justice
O’Connor found that the crèche display carried “religious and indeed
sectarian significance” 229 but that given “the overall holiday setting” the
purpose of the display was the “celebration of a public holiday with
traditional symbols.” 230 Thus, she concluded that “[i]t cannot fairly be
understood to convey a message of government endorsement of religion.”231
Applying the same test five years later in County of Allegheny v. ACLU, the
majority found that a crèche—not in a park surrounded by the Christmas
kitsch of Santa and his reindeer, but standing alone on the Grand Staircase
of the Allegheny County Courthouse, tastefully framed by an arrangement
of poinsettias—reflected the government’s decision “to celebrate Christmas
in a way that has the effect of endorsing a patently Christian message: Glory
225. County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 593.
226. Id. at 593-594 (quoting Justice O’Connor’s opinion, Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687). Justice
Blackmun later added that since Lynch the standard for “evaluating the effect of government conduct
under the Establishment Clause” is “whether ‘the challenged governmental action is sufficiently likely to
be perceived by adherents of the controlling denominations as an endorsement, and by the nonadherents
as a disapproval, of their individual religious choices.’” Id. at 597 (quoting Grand Rapids School Dist. v.
Ball, 474 U.S. 373, 390 (1985)).
227. Board of Ed. Of Kiryas Joel Village School Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 720-721 (1994
(O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (identifying different categories of
Establishment Clause cases, including those involving “government speech on religious topics” and that
different categories “call for different approaches” and not a single test); Capitol Square, 515 U.S. at 807
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that the Establishment Clause “prohibits government from appearing to
take a position on questions of religious belief” and that “[a]t least when religious symbols are involved,
the question whether the State is ‘appearing to take a position’ is best judged from the stand-point of the
‘reasonable observer’”) (quoting County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. 573).
228. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 671.
229. Id. at 692 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
230. Id. at 692-693.
231. Id. at 693.
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to God for the birth of Jesus Christ,”232 a conclusion with which O’Connor
concurred.233
(B) Religious Images and the Absence of Government
Endorsement
The disparate outcomes in the two cases serve to highlight the
subjectivity and lack of predictability that critics charge are endemic to the
endorsement test.234 What is predictable in almost any decision applying
the test, however, is the appearance of some dicta recognizing the
possibility of government use of a religious image or symbol in a manner
that is constitutionally permitted. Indeed, judicial opinions applying the
endorsement test often claim that the religious image or symbol in
question—whether a crèche, a cross, 235 a copy of the Ten
Commandments, 236 or a Chanukah menorah 237 —could be placed in a
context that would not violate the Establishment Clause. While this context
does not erase or “neutralize” the religious content of the image or symbol,
it may “negate[] any message of endorsement of that content.”238
The example of government use of a religious image that does not
constitute an unconstitutional endorsement most often cited in these
decisions is the display of religious art in a state-sponsored museum. 239
232. County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 601.
233. Id. at 626 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
234. Jesse H. Choper, The Endorsement Test: Its Status and Desirability, 18 J. L. & POL. 499, 514
(2002) (the ad hoc, fact-based analysis prompted by the test “fails to afford government officials with the
degree of predictability needed to craft legislation that will withstand constitutional scrutiny”).
235. Capitol Square, 515 U.S. 753.
236. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005); McCreary County v. American Civil Liberties
Union of Ky., 545 U.S. 844 (2005).
237. County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. 573.
238. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 692 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
239. Id. at 676-677 (noting that “[a]rt galleries supported by public revenues display religious
paintings of the 15th and 16th centuries, predominantly inspired by one religious faith” and the National
Gallery “has long exhibited masterpieces with religious messages, notably the Last Supper, and
paintings depicting the Birth of Christ, the Crucifixion, and the Resurrection, among many others with
explicit Christian themes and messages”); id. at 683 (arguing that “the exhibition of literally hundreds of
religious paintings in governmentally supported museums” may benefit “one faith or religion” or all
religions but that this benefit is “indirect, remote, and incidental”); id. at 712-713 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the crèche at issue does not “play[] the same role that an ordinary museum
display does”; that studying the Bible or Milton’s Paradise Lost is permitted because “[t]he purpose is
plainly not to single out the particular religious beliefs that may have inspired the authors”; that the
crèche might be permitted if it “were displayed in a museum setting, in the company of other religiously
inspired artifacts, as an example, among many, of the symbolic representation of religious myths” since
“[i]n that setting, we would have objective guarantees that the crèche could not suggest that a particular
religious faith had been singled out for public favor and recognition”); County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at
573 (citing to O’Connor’s reference to the museum setting of a religious article in Lynch); id. at 624
(O’Connor) (citing to Burger’s discussion of state supported museums Lynch); id. at 635 (citing to her
argument in Lynch that the museum setting does not neutralize religious content but negates the message
of endorsement); see also Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 811 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
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Thus, Justice David Souter insists that “the Government of the United States
does not violate the Establishment Clause by hanging Giotto’s Madonna on
the wall of the National Gallery,”240 and Justice Stevens asserts that it would
be “absurd” to invoke the Establishment Clause “to exclude religious
paintings by Italian Renaissance masters from a public museum.” 241
Notwithstanding their obvious differences, in this respect, the display of the
exotic cow in the public zoo that Stevens hypothesizes242 is akin to the art
museum’s display of Giotto’s Madonna. Although each item might be
perceived as “religious” by some observer (because the observer notes that
others invest the item with special significance), neither display could be
perceived by a reasonable observer as an “endorsement” of religion by the
government “conveying or attempting to convey a message that religion or a
particular religious belief is favored or preferred.”243
The Court, however, has not confined the application of the
endorsement test to cases involving displays of religious images or symbols.
Indeed, members of the Court have made use of the endorsement test in
reviewing a law exempting religious employers from an anti-discrimination
statute, 244 the practice of school sanctioned prayer before high school
football games,245 a policy excluding religious student groups from the use
of public school facilities, 246 a law authorizing the teaching of “creation
science” along side the theory of evolution,247 and a statute authorizing a
minute of silence in public schools for “meditation or voluntary prayer.”248

(arguing that the acts of legislative prayer under review in the case “are not museum pieces on display
once a day for the edification of the legislature”); Pleasant Grove City v. Summan, 555 U.S. 460, 477 n.
5 (2009) (arguing that “a painting of a religious scene may have been commissioned and painted to
express religious thoughts and feelings. Even if the painting is donated to a museum by a patron who
shares those thoughts and feelings, it does not follow that the museum, by displaying the painting,
intends to convey or is perceived as conveying the same ‘message.’”).
240. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 742 (asserting that “the Government of the United States does not
violate the Establishment Clause by hanging Giotto’s Madonna on the wall of the National Gallery” but
that, contrary to the majority’s description of the Texas Capitol grounds “17 monuments with no
common appearance, history, or esthetic role scattered over 22 acres is not a museum”).
241. County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 653 (saying that it would be “absurd to exclude” images of
Moses, Confucius and Mohammed from a courtroom display of “great lawgivers” such as Augustus,
Blackstone, Napoleon and John Marshall, just as it would be absurd “to exclude religious paintings by
Italian Renaissance masters from a public museum”).
242. Capitol Square, 515 U.S. at 808 n. 14 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
243. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 70.
244. Corporation of Presiding Bishop, 483 U.S. at 348 (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment).
245. Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 308.
246. Westside Community Bd., 496 U.S. at 249-250; id. at 268-269 (Marshall, J., concurring in
judgment).
247. Edwards, 482 U.S. at 585.
248. Wallace, 472 U.S. 38.
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(C) Substantive Legislation That Coincides with Religion
and the Lack of “Something More”
But substantive works of legislation are not like works of art. Whereas
an image or symbol can be presented by the government in a context that
preserves its religious content but “negates any message of [government]
endorsement of that content”249 (as in the case of religious art displayed in a
museum), the same cannot be said of a statue that governs the conduct of
others. The endorsement of the religious idea that allegedly animates a
regulatory statute cannot be separated from the religious idea itself. This is
because the act of endorsement is intrinsic to the very act of legislation.
The ideas and beliefs behind a duly enacted statute are always “preferred”
over their alternatives. They are always “favored” and “promoted” over
their rivals. As such, a statute necessarily communicates “disapproval” of
the opposite view.250
According to McGowan v. Maryland and Harris v. McRae, in order for
a statute to violate the Establishment Clause it must do “something more”251
than merely “coincide or harmonize with the tenets of some or all
religions.”252 But in the case of a regulatory statute—like the anti-abortion
law at issue in Webster—the act of “endorsement” cannot be the “something
more” that is needed to transform a mere coincidence into an establishment
of religion. Indeed, where the challenged governmental action is a law that
proscribes or prescribes a given form of conduct, the act of “endorsement”
is not “something more”—only more of the same.
That is to say, the conclusion that the government has “endorsed”
something adds nothing to the conclusion that the thing endorsed is
“religious” insofar as both derive from the same source, namely, the
perception of the “reasonable observer.” Every statute is animated by a set
of beliefs—both normative and descriptive—and the government endorses
these beliefs when it enacts a given law.253 In applying the endorsement test
to a statute, there is no judgment of governmental “endorsement” separate
and apart from the judgment that one or more of these beliefs is “religious”
in character. If the reasonable observer perceives that the idea driving the
challenged legislation is a religious belief, then the law cannot help but be

249. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 692 (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment).
250. See County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 593-594 (describing the act of “endorsement” variously
in terms of “favoring,” “preferring,” and “promoting” religious beliefs and expressing “disapproval” of
contrary views).
251. Harris, 448 U.S. at 320.
252. McGowan, 366 U.S. at 442.
253. Smith, supra note 154, at 310 (“Government cannot act without making judgments; and such
judgments will inevitably conflict with, and thereby imply disapproval of, the beliefs of some citizens.”).
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seen as an endorsement of that belief, that is, as “appearing to take a
position on [a] question[] of religious belief.”254
In the absence of “something more” the conclusion that a statute is
“religious” and so violates the Establishment Clause turns entirely upon the
reasonable observer’s perception that it is “religious,” and this in turn is a
function of the fact that the statute “happens to coincide or harmonize with
the tenets”255 of a religious faith. Thus, when applied to a substantive,
regulatory statute, the endorsement test repudiates the principle announced
by the Court in McGowan and Harris.
Accordingly, although Justice Stevens appears to acknowledge the
authority of McGowan and Harris in his Webster opinion, this
acknowledgement is only rhetorical. His conclusion that the Missouri
statute is “an unequivocal endorsement of a religious tenet”256—his proof
that the Missouri legislature’s finding that the life of a new human being
begins at conception is a “theological ‘finding’”257—rests entirely upon the
fact that this premise “happens to coincide with the tenets of certain
religions.” 258 Appearances notwithstanding, Justice Stevens in fact
repudiates the law embodied in McGowan and Harris. His application of
the endorsement test in Webster rejects the very law that he purports to
uphold.
b. Finding Religion in That Which Is Inherently Religious
There is one final way to interpret Justice Stevens’ bold statement that
the Missouri statute in Webster violates the Establishment Clause and that
this conclusion “rests on the fact that the preamble [is] an unequivocal
endorsement of a religious tenet of some but by no means all Christian
faiths,” and that it “serves no identifiable secular interest.”259 Under this
reading the preamble to the Missouri statute is “religious” and “serves no
identifiable secular purpose” because even if the Missouri legislators
enacted the statute without intending to give juridical expression to an
article of faith, they did so anyway—inevitably and unavoidably—because
the proposition that “life begins at conception” is inherently religious.
Unlike the first reading suggested above, 260 under this interpretation
Justice Stevens does not mistake a conclusion for an argument. If this was
Justice Stevens’ intended meaning, then he is not guilty of a logical error.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.

County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 594.
McGowan, 366 U.S. at 442.
Webster, 492 U.S. at 566 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 572.
Id. at 566.
Id. at 566-67 (internal citations omitted).
See supra Part II.B.3.a.i and Part II.B.a.ii.
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This is a coherent claim, but it is only a claim. It is not an argument, and
Stevens gives almost no sense of an obligation to offer an argument in
support of what he holds to be true.261 He does not suggest how courts
might distinguish between those propositions that are inherently religious
from those that are only occasionally or circumstantially religious within a
given social and historical context. Doing so would require not merely an
argument but an elaborate theory exploring the epistemological foundation
of belief in general and distinguishing “secular” beliefs from “religious”
beliefs. 262 Given Justice Stevens’ method of finding religious purpose
through naked assertion, such a theory is well beyond not only the bounds
of Stevens’ Webster opinion but all of his religion clause opinions.
4. Delayed Animation, St. Thomas Aquinas and Justice Stevens’
Embarrassing Analogy
The remainder of the Justice Stevens’ opinion in Webster is replete with
references to the “theological position” endorsed by the Missouri statute, the
“theological tenet” embodied in it, a “theological answer to the question of
when life begins,” and the “theological ‘finding’ of the Missouri
legislature.”263 But these are only bald assertions. The fact that Justice
Stevens adamantly refuses to consider any possible secular purpose that the
statutory preamble might serve—such as the desire to educate the public as
to the reasons behind the legislation, reasons grounded in the scientific
conclusion that the unborn are human beings, members of the species homo
sapiens, beings that share the same intrinsic nature as any adult human—
does not mean that such a purpose is wholly absent. Instead, it only
demonstrates the ease with which Stevens employs insular pronouncements
in place of genuine argument.
Stevens does present a tortured, sad, and embarrassing passage in which
he sets forth the views of St. Thomas Aquinas on abortion and then draws
an analogy between these views and the Missouri statute at issue in the
case. Justice Stevens correctly explains that Aquinas subscribed to a theory
of “delayed animation” according to which it was thought that the embryo
was not infused with a soul until 40 days following conception for males,
and 80 days for females. He also notes that these views were once widely
held in the Christian West. Stevens then opines:
261. Cf. Ely, supra note 92 at 947 (asserting that Roe is not bad constitutional law “because it is
not constitutional law and gives almost no sense of an obligation to try to be”).
262. In their respective books Peter Wenz and Ronald Dworkin set forth arguments that purport to
identify propositions that are unavoidably religious and so are not a proper subject for legal regulation.
See WENZ, supra note 33; DWORKIN, supra note 33. The argument that each offers is deeply flawed,
but, unlike Justice Stevens, Wenz and Dworkin at least recognize the need to make an argument.
263. Id. at 568, 570, and 572.
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If the views of St. Thomas were held as widely today as they were
in the Middle Ages, and if a state legislature were to enact a statute
prefaced with a “finding” that female life begins 80 days after
conception and male life begins 40 days after conception, I have no
doubt that this Court would promptly conclude that such an
endorsement of a particular religious tenet is violative of the
Establishment Clause.264
This passage is telling in a number of respects. First, as is true of
Justice Stevens’ Webster opinion elsewhere, Stevens makes no attempt to
show that the substance of the views expressed—40 day animation for
males, 80 day animation for females—are religious. These claims are
certainly outlandish in light of modern embryology, but that does not mean
that they are religious, only that they are wrong. Instead, Stevens assumes
their religious character, presumably because these views were once
“widely accepted by leaders of the Roman Catholic Church for many
years.” 265 He assumes that this historic connection will do the work of
proving that the substance of the view embodied in law is “religious.” He
also assumes that the religious identity of the author cited as the source of
this view—St. Thomas Aquinas, a saint of the Catholic Church, a
Dominican friar and theologian—will ensure that people will infer that the
view itself is religious. What Justice Stevens fails to mention—an omission
that can only be regarded as egregious—is that the supposedly “religious”
indeed, Christian theory of “delayed animation” attributed to St. Thomas
Aquinas and all of late medieval Christendom was not of Christian origin.
Instead, Aquinas acquired these views from Aristotle, 266 a pagan Greek
philosopher who died three centuries before Christ was born.267
Stevens is playing on the eagerness—and one might even say the latent
prejudice—of readers to confound the message with the messenger—to
assume that a Catholic (even a Catholic from the 13th century) speaking on a
controversial issue is attempting to introduce Catholic doctrine into what
264. Id. at 568.
265. Id. at 567.
266. JOHN CONNERY, S.J., ABORTION: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ROMAN CATHOLIC
PERSPECTIVE 17-18 (1977) (citing Aristotle, On the History of Animals, bk. 7, 3); John Haldane &
Patrick Lee, Aquinas on Human Ensoulment, Abortion and the Value of Life, 78 PHILOSOPHY 255-278,
n.
18
(2003),
available
at
http://www2.franciscan.edu/plee/aquinas_on_human_ensoulment.htm#_edn18.
267. To his credit, Justice Blackmun makes note of this fact in his original opinion in Roe. See
Roe, 410 U.S. at 160 (referring to the “Aristotelian theory of ‘mediate animation” that “held sway
throughout the Middle Ages and the Renaissance in Europe [and] continued to be official Roman
Catholic dogma until the 19th century”).
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should be a conversation of shared public reasons. This, it should be
candidly noted, is a form of ad hominem attack.
Finally, it is worth noting that under the terms of his own hypothetical
Justice Stevens’ conclusion is far from certain. Recall that the premise with
which he began was to suppose that the views of St. Thomas Aquinas “were
held as widely today as they were in the Middle Ages.”268 If we are to
accept this as the vantage point from which to view the claims about
delayed animation of the embryo, then Justice Stevens is surely wrong to
suggest that the Court “would promptly conclude” that a law incorporating
this view was “an endorsement of a particular religious tenet” because such
a Court would likely not perceive such a view as religious at all. The
members of a court living in such a context would no more see such a view
as “religious” than we today see the big-bang theory or the theory of
evolution as “religious.” It would not be seen as distinctly theological or as
an expression of faith, but as an accepted part of the sum total of scientific
knowledge and a familiar feature of the larger cultural landscape in which
they dwelt.
C. Justice Stevens’ Opinion in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey
In 1992, nineteen years after the Court’s momentous decision in Roe v.
Wade, the Court confronted a direct challenge to the constitutional right to
abortion created in that case. In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey, a 5-4 majority voted to reaffirm and retain what it
described as Roe’s “essential holding.”269 For the majority this meant “a
recognition of the right of the woman to choose to have an abortion before
viability,” as well as recognition of the state’s ability to “restrict abortions
after fetal viability, if the law contains exceptions for pregnancies which
endanger the woman’s life or health.”270
Justice Stevens sided with the majority in Casey in upholding “the
central holding of Roe v. Wade” on the basis of stare decisis. For Stevens
“[t]he social costs of overruling Roe at this late date would be enormous.”271
He also sided with the majority for its “reaffirmation of Roe’s explanation
of why the State’s obligation to protect the life or health of the mother must
take precedence over any duty to the unborn,” namely, that the fetus is not a
“person” within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. 272 A
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.

Webster, 492 U.S. at 568 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Casey, 505 U.S. at 846.
Id. at 846.
Id. at 912.
Id. at 912-913.
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“developing organism that is not yet a ‘person’” cannot, he said, “have what
is sometimes described as a ‘right to life.’”273
On several key points, however, Justice Stevens parted company with
the Joint Opinion authored by Justices O’Connor, Kennedy and Souter that
announced the judgment of the court and around which a shifting majority
coalesced. Justice Stevens rejected the view taken in the Joint Opinion that
the trimester framework should be abandoned, and that the Court should
adopt an “undue burden” standard for assessing abortion regulations
throughout pregnancy.274 Explaining this disagreement required, he said, a
careful articulation of “the nature of the interests at stake.”275 It was in this
context that Stevens returned to the theme of religion and the regulation of
abortion. Here he did not add anything to substantiate his prior assertions in
Thornburgh and Webster that the interest in protecting the life of the unborn
was “religious” and thus prohibited under the First Amendment. He did,
however, clarify his understanding of what he believed those interests to be.
Citing his opinions in Thornburgh and Webster, Justice Stevens said
that “in order to be legitimate, the State’s interest must be secular;
consistent with the First Amendment the State may not promote a
theological or sectarian interest.”276 This largely uncontroversial277 point of
law is not, of course, what makes his Thornburgh and Webster opinions so
deserving of criticism. Rather, it is Stevens’ assumption that he has actually
shown that the state’s interest in protecting unborn human life is “religious”

273. Id. at 91.
274. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 869-879.
275. Id. at 914 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
276. Id.
277. I qualify this statement because of the breadth of Stevens’ claim that “the State may not
promote a theological or sectarian interest.” Under its Lemon test, the Supreme Court looks to see that
the “principal or primary effect” of a law or other state action “neither advances nor inhibits religion.”
Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-613. Because religion is a deeply embedded aspect of American society, it is
often the case that laws that are entirely secular in origin have the effect of advancing religion. The
Supreme Court is in fact deeply divided over the question of when and under what circumstances such a
law constitutes an “establishment of religion” in violation of the First Amendment. Compare Estate of
Thorton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 710 (1985) (striking down a statute that allowed an employee to
not work on his or her religious Sabbath as “ha[ving] a primary effect that impermissibly advances a
particular religious practice”) with Corporation of Presiding Bishop, 483 U.S. at 336 (upholding Section
702 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 that exempts religious organizations from the statutory prohibition
against discrimination in employment on the basis of religion even though it has the effect of helping
religious organizations advance their purposes). Laws that advance religion in an incidental fashion, or
that more substantially advance religion but do so indirectly may be permitted. See Widmar v. Vincent,
454 U.S. 263, 273 (1981) (holding that university could not deny religious student group use of school
facilities available to other groups explaining that “a religious organization’s enjoyment of merely
‘incidental’ benefits does not violate the prohibition against ‘primary advancement’ of religion”);
Zelman v. Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 649 (2002) (upholding school voucher program that allowed parents to
send their children to private and religiously affiliated schools because the “government aid reaches
religious schools only as a result of the genuine and independent choices of private individuals”).
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when in fact he has done no such thing. He has merely asserted that this is
the case—a flaw that Stevens’ opinion in Casey does nothing to correct.
For Justice Stevens the state’s interest in “protecting potential life” is
“not grounded in the Constitution” because the unborn child is not a
“person.” 278 Instead, Justice Stevens says that the state has “an indirect
interest supported by both humanitarian and pragmatic concerns.” 279
Stevens does not define what he means by “humanitarian” or “pragmatic”
but he does give two examples. First, he says that “[m]any of our citizens”
are offended at the “disrespect for potential human life”280 that they perceive
in the practice of abortion, and the state “has a legitimate interest in
minimizing such offense.”281 Second, the state also has a pragmatic interest
“in expanding the population, believing society would benefit from the
services of additional productive citizens.”282
It is clear from these two examples that, for Justice Stevens, the unborn
have no intrinsic value. They are relevant only insofar as their demise or
continued existence has some effect on others. Because they are not
“persons,” their value is only instrumental.
Of course, even if the unborn are not “persons” this does not entirely
resolve the matter of what constitutes legitimate state interests. As one
early critic of the Roe decision put it “[d]ogs are not ‘persons in the whole
sense’ nor have they constitutional rights, but that does not mean the state
cannot prohibit killing them: It does not even mean the state cannot prohibit
killing them in the exercise of the First Amendment right of political
protest.”283 Justice Stevens might describe this concern for the well-being
278. Casey, 505 U.S. at 914.
279. Id.
280. Justice Stevens proves himself incapable of describing what these citizens actually find
offensive in the act of abortion—not “disrespect for potential human life” but the actual loss of human
life—the deliberate killing of a real (albeit developing) human being. He could acknowledge this point
of view even as he expresses his personal disagreement with it. Instead, reality must be seen through
Justice Stevens’ chosen lens even as he purports to describe how others see the world. Sadly, he is not
alone in this regard. Justice Stephen Breyer has proven himself similarly incapable of describing what
opponents of abortion actually believe. In Stenberg v. Carhart, he said that “[m]illions of Americans
believe that life begins at conception and consequently that an abortion is akin to causing the death of an
innocent child.” Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 920 (2000). On the contrary, pro-lifers do not
believe that abortion is merely akin to causing the death of an innocent child, but that it is the deliberate
and intentional killing of an innocent child.
281. Casey, 505 U.S. at 915.
282. Id. Justice Stevens here adds a footnote in which he attempts to clarify the point he is trying
to make. He says that “[t]he state interest in protecting potential life may be compared with the state
interest in protecting those who seek to immigrate to this country.” Id. n. 3.
283. Ely, supra note 92 at 926. Building on this analogy, Ely concludes that the conclusion “[t]hat
the life plans of the mother must, not simply may, prevail over the state’s desire to protect the fetus
simply does not follow from the judgment that the fetus is not a person.” Id. Professor Tribe thinks that
there is an “obvious difference” in that the expression of protest Ely hypothesizes “need not entail killing
anything” whereas “a woman’s fundamental liberty of reproductive autonomy and bodily integrity
necessarily collides with fetal survival prior to viability.” TRIBE, supra note 22 at 927 n. 47. The
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of canines as “humanitarian”—an attempt to minimize causing offense to
others. Of course, Justice Stevens does not explain what he means by
“humanitarian” any more than he explains what makes anti-abortion
legislation “religious.” This lack of rigor—really a lack of judicial
accountability—could, with little effort, be turned against its author. If
Stevens’ opinion were read with the same suspicion with which he views
laws that restrict abortion, then the laws he would defend as being supported
by “humanitarian” concerns could be dismissed as covert attempts to import
religious sentiments into law. From this perspective, the rhetorical veneer
of “humanitarian” concerns should not distract courts from seeing the
underlying substance of religious dogma and “the absence of any secular
purpose.”284
To label a law “religious” and then dismiss it out-of-hand is what passes
for argument in Stevens’ opinions in Thornburgh, Webster and Casey. Such
a “method of reasoning” is not only superficial and lacking in rigor, it is
anti-intellectual, playing as it does off the latent prejudices and fears of
some citizens. As such, it is unworthy of law.
III. CONCLUSION
The point of this essay has not been to demonstrate that the right to
abortion, as set forth by the Court in Roe and revised in Casey, has no
plausible basis in the Constitution. Nor has the point been to show that
powerful arguments cannot be made on behalf of such a right, or that any
arguments made in favor of such a right are doomed to failure. Instead, the
aim of this essay has been far more modest, namely, to show the vacuous
nature of Justice John Paul Stevens’ claim that laws seeking to afford some
protection to the human child developing in utero are religious and so
invariably violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. I have
focused on Justice Stevens’ opinions in Thornburgh, Webster and Casey in
part because they are the most prominent expression of this point-of-view.
Furthermore, the argumentative strategy that Stevens employs is exemplary
of the approach taken by others who seek to advance the same perspective.
While the point of the foregoing essay has not been to address the larger
question of abortion as a constitutional right, it has been to show that the
difference is not so obvious, however, if one understands the political protestor whom Ely imagines as
one who insists on killing dogs in order to make his point in the same way that one understands the
pornographer who insists that he needs to show the graphic images he employs in order to communicate
the message he wishes to convey—no substitute will do. From this perspective the collision between the
expression (i.e. killing dogs) and the legal prohibition of that expression (i.e. a law that protects the life
of dogs qua non-persons) is just as unavoidable as the conflict between the pregnant woman and the
fetus.
284. Webster, 492 U.S.at 566 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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perspective offered by Justice Stevens in Thornburgh, Webster, and Casey
is intellectually vacuous. In truth, Stevens does not set forth any argument,
only a claim founded on and sustained by nothing more than mere assertion.
He makes no effort to explain what the quality of being “religious” is and
thus what makes a proposition “religious” and so impermissible as a basis
for law.285 Nor does he counter the argument that this purportedly religious
proposition is supported by a secular rationale. He simply declares the
impossibility of any identifiable secular rationale and so feels at liberty to
ignore what the proponents of the challenged legislation proffer. More than
this, neither Justice Stevens, nor anyone else making the claim, responds to
the argument that to the extent that a law is “religious” because it places
great value on the entity developing in the womb, in the same manner a law
(including a judicial decision) that places little or no value on the entity
developing in the womb is equally “religious.” If the former amounts to an
“establishment of religion” the latter does as well.
The point of the argumentative strategy used by Stevens in his opinions
is to foreclose substantive debate on the issue—to win an argument without
ever really having one. As legal historian Joseph Dellapenna has observed
[a] major ploy in the ongoing abortion controversy has been for
supporters of abortion rights to smear opponents as acting out of
religious bigotry. The more the supporters of abortion rights make
the tag stick in the public mind, the more they cut off the public’s
careful consideration of the arguments against abortion rights.286

285. As noted above, the vast majority of writers who have sought to portray the pro-life position
as inherently religious and thus illegitimate as a basis for law have ignored these questions. They have,
like Justice Stevens, merely asserted the truth of what is their burden to show. Some few writers have
acknowledged the need for genuine argument—for a deeper examination of the issues and establishment
of the premises upon which their conclusion rests. See, e.g., WENZ, supra note 33; DWORKIN, supra
note 33. A careful critique of these works exceeds the scope of this essay. While neither Dworkin nor
Wenz succeeds in showing the religious and thus illicit basis of the pro-life argument (indeed each must
be counted as a spectacular failure in this regard) they should be credited with at least seeing the need for
further argument.
286. DELLAPENNA, supra note 44 at 791. Ramesh Ponnuru nicely summarizes the situation this
way:
Let us imagine a pro-lifer who says that abortion should be illegal because it kills human
beings. His pro-choice friend responds that this sort of theological talk is inadmissible in a
democracy because it violates the rules of open debate. We can see that this pro-choicer
has misrepresented his friend’s views and shut down the discussion – all in the name of
reasoned argument. Yet that conversation happens all the time in our politics, and
somehow we don’t see it.
RAMESH PONNURU, THE PARTY OF DEATH: THE DEMOCRATS, THE MEDIA, THE COURTS, AND THE
DISREGARD FOR HUMAN LIFE 103 (2006).
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Of course, one would hope for more than a “tag” fastened with the adhesive
of accusation from a member of the nation’s highest court. One would hope
for a rigorous argument, free from the tackiness of soft-pedaled religious
prejudice. For anyone who respects the rule of law, that much should be
“obvious.”287

287. See Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 778 (Stevens, J., concurring); Webster, 492 U.S. at 569
(Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).

